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I. INTRODUCTION
Testimony by live witnesses in open court forms the basis of the American
trial. Today, almost anyone having relevant information is competent to testify.,
Fact-finders know, however, that not all testimony should be given the same
weight. A witness may have failed to perceive events clearly or have forgotten
important details. A witness may give ambiguous testimony or simply be lying.
Cross-examination is the tool designed to reveal these defects.
Cross-examiners can use several different means to suggest a witness is
lying. Two of the most important are to show a witness has a criminal conviction2
or committed a bad act sometime in the past.3 In both instances the questioner
wants the fact-finder to infer the witness is not a law-abiding or moral person and
therefore cannot be trusted to tell the truth.
People have long disagreed about the probative value and prejudicial effect
of these forms of impeachment. People disagree about what kinds of convictions
and bad acts bear on credibility and about whether unfair prejudice occurs when
jurors learn of the misconduct. Some believe that virtually any misconduct bears
on credibility, while others think wrongdoing tells us nothing about a person's
character for truthfulness unless it directly involves deception or false statement.
Some believe evidence of misconduct is enormously prejudicial, particularly if the
witness is a criminal defendant. As then-Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
*Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Amherst College; J.D. Columbia University.
The author wishes to thank Eugene Cerruti, Brannon Heath, Randolph Jonakait, and Tanina Rostain
for their helpful comments on a draft of this Article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Alina Gail Bjerke and John Kutner.
'See FED. R. EvID. 601 ("Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules."). The Advisory Committee's note makes clear that Rule 601 is a "general
ground-clearing" that abolishes such traditional grounds of incompetency as religious belief,
conviction of a crime, and connection with the litigation as a party or interested person. Id.
(advisory committee's note).
21d. 609.
31d. 608(b)Other methods of impeaching credibility are to show that the witness has a bad
reputation for truthfulness, id. 608(a), made a prior statement inconsistent with the trial testimony,
id. 613, or is biased, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984). A party may also present
evidence contradicting the witness's testimony FED. R. EVID. 611 (b).
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The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or
jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus
exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present
charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation
irrespective of guilt of the present charge.4
Others think the danger of unfair prejudice is overstated and can be cured by
proper instructions to the jury or that the probative value of misconduct evidence
is so high it should be admitted regardless of prejudice.
Courts have responded to the different views by articulating a wide range of
standards and applying them inconsistently. The Advisory Committee and
Congress were unable to resolve the disagreements when they enacted Rules 609
and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern impeachment by
convictions and specific instances of conduct, respectively. Stymied, Congress
enacted the rules with such vague, ambiguous language that judges could continue
to allow whatever sort of impeachment they had allowed before the rules were
enacted. To make matters worse, Congress enacted the rules separately and made
little attempt to harmonize them, thus increasing the inconsistency between the
two impeachment methods. Predictably, the elastic standards of Rules 609 and
608(b) led to inconsistent decisions. Some federal courts construe the rules to
allow impeachment with a broad range of crimes and misconduct while others are
much more restrictive.
The extraordinary inconsistency in this area of the law causes serious
problems in the administration of justice. My thesis is that courts should attempt
to harmonize practice both between the rules and within each rule. I suggest
several ways to achieve these goals.
The Article has three parts. Part II traces the history of impeachment by
convictions and bad acts. It documents the enormous disparities in standards and
their application that have marred this area of the law since the 1700s. Part II also
reviews the disappointing performance of the Advisory Committee and Congress
in enacting Rules 609 and 608(b) and the resulting inconsistent modem practice.
Part III discusses the many significant problems caused by the current
cacophony. Litigants are denied equal protection of the laws. The law is
unpredictable, which makes planning difficult. Parties are unfairly prejudiced.
Judges exercise virtually unbridled discretion. Finally, some judges follow the
unseemly practice of admitting misconduct under Rule 608(b) that they have
excluded under Rule 609 as unduly prejudicial, and vice versa.
Part IV sets forth my suggestions for change. I propose several ways to
lessen inconsistencies between the rules. The proposals are based on the premise
4People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 198 (1930) (quoting 1 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§ 194).
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that with both forms of impeachment, it is the underlying misconduct that reflects
on a witness's credibility. A conviction merely makes it somewhat more likely the
misconduct occurred; it does not enhance the probity of the misconduct.5
Specifically, I propose courts read several of the protections of Rule 609 into Rule
608(b), allow impeachment with the same criminal misconduct under Rule 609(a)
and 608(b), apply the Huddleston v. United States6 prima facie case standard for
determining whether the prior misconduct occurred, and harmonize application
of Rules 609(a)(2) and 608(b) by construing Rule 609(a)(2) narrowly so only
convictions directly involving lying or deception are admitted automatically. As
to the inconsistencies within each rule, I see little point in advocating a broad or
narrow approach to either form of impeachment becausejudges' views are largely
set.7 Instead, I propose a process for working toward a genuine compromise that
might lessen the inconsistencies in practice.
II. THE MANY APPROACHES TO IMPEACHMENT BY
CONVICTIONS AND BAD ACTS
A. Early History
As long as there have been witnesses, courts have struggled to set appropriate
standards for impeaching witness credibility. Courts allowed very broad attacks
historically. As late as the 1700s, English courts allowed impeachment by the
testimony of others as to a witness's general bad character.8 Courts reasoned that
a general bad character necessarily raised questions about a witness's willingness
to obey an oath to tell the truth. As Wigmore succinctly stated, "to show general
moral degeneration is to show an inevitable degeneration in veracity."9 Courts
5The arguments for and against this premise are discussed in detail infra notes 245-50 and
accompanying text.
6485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988).
7See infra notes 333-37 and accompanying text.83A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 923, at 728 (James H.
Chadbourn, ed., rev. ed. 1970). Early American cases also admitted such evidence. See, e.g., Carter
v. Cavenaugh, 1 Greene 171, 173 (Iowa 1848) (noting broad view of some courts that "inquiry may
be, as to the general moral character of the witness, for the purpose of impeaching him"); State v.
Boswell, 13 N.C. (2 Dev. Eq.) 209, 210 (1829) (stating that in 1804 state adopted rule "that to
discredit a witness you might prove him to be of bad moral character; and the question was not
confined to his character for veracity" (emphasis added)).
93A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 922, at 726.
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also allowed character witnesses to detail the bases for their opinions.'° Witnesses
were quite freely attacked with testimony as to their past life and misdeeds."
In time, certain restrictions developed on character testimony. Judges
questioned whether general bad character necessarily indicated a lack of
veracity. 12 They also sought to protect witnesses from undue harassment.'
3
Consequently, character witnesses were eventually limited to testifying about the
impeached witness's character for veracity4 and were no longer permitted to
recount specific bad acts.'5
These limitations did not necessarily keep jurors from learning about the
misconduct of witnesses, however, because witnesses themselves could still be
asked about the misconduct on cross-examination. As Wigmore states, during the
1700s "exploiting of the witness' life and associations, however discreditable, was
freely allowed. The orthodox rule came to be that 'any question tending to
discredit' might be asked; and only rarely was there any interference from the
court."' 6 Courts did not allow the misconduct to be proven by extrinsic evidence,
and thus the questioner was bound by the witness's denial.' 7 This rule avoided the
confusion and inefficiency of mini-trials on whether the witness had committed
the bad act.
The rules governing bad act impeachment proved much more resistant to
change than the rules regulating the testimony of character witnesses. Wigmore
reports that England maintained "this practically unlimited license of cross-
examination" into the late 1800s. 8 During this period, practice in the United
States varied because judges stubbornly disagreed about what kinds of bad acts
"
0Id. § 979, at 823 (explaining that because witness could give his personal judgment of
impeached witness's character based on his acquaintance with him, it was "an easy concession to
allow the impeaching witness to describe among his reasons such specific conduct, good or bad, as
might have become known to him").
1 1d.
1
2See id. § 922, at 727-28 (citing examples).
I'31d. § 922, at 727 ("[T]he incidental unpleasant features of the witness-box are largely
increased when the way is opened to this broad and loose method of abusing those who are called
as witnesses.").
14See id. § 923, at 729-34 n.2 (presenting exhaustive state-by-state review showing this to be
rule in majority of American jurisdictions).
51d. § 979, at 823. Wigmore points to two policy reasons for this limitation. First, testimony
pro and con about whether a witness has engaged in particular misconduct tended to distract judge
and jury from the central issues in a case. Id. at 826. Second, witnesses were unfairly surprised: "A
witness cannot be expected to be prepared to disprove every alleged act of his life." Id. at 827.
61d. § 986, at 857; see also 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 41 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999) ("[T]he English common law tradition of 'cross-examination to credit' permits counsel to
inquire into the witness's associations and personal history including any misconduct tending to
discredit his character...").
"See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 986, at 855-56 (citing examples in note 2).
"Id. at 858.
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were probative of credibility.' 9 Some courts admitted virtually any kind of witness
misconduct to impeach,2° while others were much more restrictive and excluded
bad acts that did not bear on credibility directly.2'
Impeachment of witnesses with a criminal conviction developed later than
impeachment with bad acts because most people convicted of a crime were
deemed incompetent to testify.22 During the nineteenth century, most American
jurisdictions abrogated this rule. Persons convicted of a crime were allowed to
testify, but the conviction could be used to impeach their credibility.23 As with bad
'
9See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 41 ("In this country, there is a confusing
variety of decisions[ concerning impeachment by misconduct], occasionally even in the same
jurisdiction.").
"3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 983, at 840; see, e.g., Tla-Koo-Yel-Lee v. United States, 167
U.S. 274, 276-77 (1897) (allowing impeachment by questioning state's witness as to whether she
lived with man not her husband); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Bizzell, 30 So. 777, 780 (Ala. 1901)
(allowing cross-examination of defendant's witness about habits of profanity and drinking);
McAlister v. State, 139 S.W. 684, 689 (Ark. 1911) (allowing defendant's witness to be cross-
examined as to former act of assassination); State v. Ward, 49 Conn. 429, 433, 442 (1881)
(permitting prosecution to ask defense witness whether he lived with woman who kept house of ill-
fame); State v. Watson, 72 N.W. 283, 284 (Iowa 1897) (permitting questioning of defendant about
using assumed name); State v. Wells, 37 P. 1005, 1008 (Kan. 1894) (allowing accused to be cross-
examined about prior acts of violence); People v. Casey, 72 N.Y. 393, 398 (1878) (permitting
defendant to be cross-examined about other quarrels and assaults); Lohman v. People, 1 N.Y. 379,
382, 385 (1848) (allowing questions about whether state's witness had committed fornication and
contracted venereal disease); State v. Ekanger, 80 N.W. 482,483 (N.D. 1899) (allowing defendant
to be asked whether he was professional gambler).2 13A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 938, at 840; see, e.g., Lee v. State, 50 S.W. 516, 517 (Ark.
1899) (refusing to allow question about whether witness was not mother of certain criminals); Dore
v. Babcock, 50 A. 1016, 1018 (Conn. 1902) (refusing to allow questions of defendant's witness
about divorce for desertion because subject did not "affect the character of the witness for
veracity"); Wallace v. State, 26 So. 713,722 (Fla. 1899) (explaining that questions concerning "past
life and history" were left to trial court's discretion while matters that do not affect credit should
not be admitted); Whitney v. State, 57 N.E. 398, 400 (Ind. 1900) (refusing to allow questions as to
whether witness committed frequent acts of assault with gang); Nolan v. Brooklyn City & Newton
R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 63, 68 (1881) (holding cross-examination as to whether defendant's witness had
been expelled from fire department improper as irrelevant to discrediting).22Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 519, at
725-26 (1979); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 42. The disqualification was not
absolute; it generally barred testimony only by persons convicted of felonies or crimen falsi. 2
WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 519, at 729 (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 373 (1842)). Not
surprisingly, there was disagreement about what crimes should be classed as crimenfalsi. See id.
at 730 ("But the extent and meaning of the term, 'crimenfalsi,' in our law, is nowhere laid down
with precision."). In addition, the disqualification sometimes applied only in the jurisdiction where
the conviction occurred. See id. at 732 (citing examples in note 3). Thus, a conviction in one state
did not necessarily render a person incompetent to testify in the courts of another state or in federal
court. Id. In such cases, the conviction "might be shown in diminution of the credit due to his
testimony." Id.23Green, 490 U.S. at 511; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 519 at 727; 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 42.
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acts, courts disagreed about what kinds of convictions could be used to impeach.24
Some courts allowed impeachment only with crimes that would formerly have
disqualified the witness from testifying.2 5 Other courts limited impeachment to
felonies, 6 or to crimes of infamy,27 or to crimes of infamy and crimenfalsi.28 In
some jurisdictions all crimes could be used to impeach, including misdemeanors,29
although some courts excluded misdemeanors that did not involve moral
turpitude.3" Unlike bad acts, convictions could be proven with extrinsic
evidence.3"
241 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 42 ("Just as the common law definition of
disqualifying crimes was not very precise, the abrogating statutes and rules suffer from
indefiniteness. In particular, the definitions of crimes for which a conviction shall be ground of
impeachment vary widely among the states ... ").25See, e.g., Solomon v. United States 297 F. 82, 92 (1st Cir. 1924) (holding admissible crime
that would formerly have disqualified witness); State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 362, 364 (1856)
(same); Bartholomew v. People, 104 11. 601, 607 (1882) (same).
26See, e.g., Hanners v. McClelland, 37 N.W. 389, 391 (Iowa 1888) (holding that plaintiff's
witness may be interrogated as to his previous conviction for felony); Young Men's Christian Ass'n
v. Rawlings, 83 N.W. 175, 175 (Neb. 1900) (refusing to allow impeachment of defendant with
offenses below felony under statute).27See, e.g., Bartholomew v. People, 104 I11. 601, 607 (1882) (holding that infamous offense
is provable); Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 40, 44 (1867) (holding that defendant's convictions of
"infamous crimes" can be used to impeach).
28E.g., State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 363,364 (1856); Matzenbaugh v. People ex rel. Galloway,
62 N.E. 546, 548 (111. 1901).
29See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 147 F. 32, 38-39 (9th Cir. 1906) (holding misdemeanors
admissible under Alaska law even if committed in another jurisdiction); Pierson v. State, 123 N.E.
118, 120 (Ind. 1919) (allowing cross-examination as to fornication conviction); State v. Manuel,
63 So. 174, 176 (La. 1913) (stating that cross-examination is not limited to felonies and allowing
questions about fence cutting); State v. Griggsby, 42 So. 497,498 (La. 1906) (admitting defendant's
conviction in city court); State v. Sauer, 44 N.W. 115, 116 (Minn. 1890) (holding that "crimes" are
not restricted to those that caused common law disqualification but also include misdemeanors);
State v. Henson, 50 A. 468, 469 (N.J. 1901) (stating that crime of any kind may be used to
impeach); Roop v. State, 34 A. 749, 749-50 (N.J. 1896) (admitting evidence that defendant kept
disorderly house).
"°See, e.g., Lovinger v. State, 146 S.E. 346, 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929) (holding conviction for
misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude inadmissible).
3 1See, e.g., State v. Price, 160 N.W. 677, 681 (Minn. 1916) (holding defendant's prior
conviction provable "either by the record or by his cross-examination"); Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich.
40, 44 (1867) (stating that defendant "may be proved by record evidence to have been convicted
of infamous crimes"). Wigmore gives two reasons why convictions may be proven with extrinsic
evidence while prior bad acts may not. 3A WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 980, at 828. First, there is
rarely confusion of issues by creating mini-trials as to whether the prior conduct resulting in
conviction happened, both because the number of prior convictions usually is small and because the
record usually provides conclusive proof. Id. Second, the witness is unlikely to be unfairly
surprised, both because he is presumed to know that his prior convictions may be used to impeach
his credibility, and because he typically would not be allowed to submit proof that he was innocent
of the crime. Id.
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In sum, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, courts were
inconsistent within each method of impeachment. The permissible scope of cross-
examination about both bad acts and convictions varied so greatly because judges
held a broad range of views as to what kinds of misconduct bore on credibility.32
There was less inconsistency, however, between the two methods of
impeachment. In deciding whether to allow impeachment, judges appeared to
focus more on the nature of the prior misconduct than on whether the witness had
been convicted of it. For example, ifajudge believed that robbery was probative
of untruthfulness, the judge would likely allow a witness to be cross-examined
about a robbery whether or not it resulted in a conviction. The overlap was not
complete because impeachment by bad acts encompassed more kinds of
wrongdoing than impeachment by conviction. Bad acts include noncriminal as
well as criminal conduct, while convictions are limited to criminal misconduct.
Nonetheless, as to criminal misconduct, individual judges were more likely to be
consistent between the two methods of impeachment, either allowing the cross-
examination or not depending on their views as to what kind of misconduct bore
on credibility.33
32See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
33Territory v. Chavez, 45 P. 1107 (N.M. 1896), provides an example of a court treating bad
acts and convictions in a very similar manner. See id. at 1107. The court barely distinguished
between the two, holding that both could be used to impeach credibility. Id. Chavez was charged
with the murder of Gabriel Sandoval. Id. The only witnesses whose testimony directly connected
the defendant with the crime were, by their own accounts, accomplices in the crime. Id. at 1107-08.
The witnesses also were notorious outlaws. Id. at 1108. One had been convicted of larceny and had
pled guilty to the murder of another man, Patricio Maes. Id. Another witness allegedly was involved
in the Maes murder and also had been charged with robbing a store and post office and cow-stealing
although he had not been prosecuted for any of these crimes, apparently in exchange for his
testimony against the defendant. Id. at 1109. The trial court forbade cross-examination of the
witnesses as to any of these matters. Id. at 1108-09. The territorial supreme court reversed. Id. at
1110. The court drew a distinction between cross-examination as to trivial matters intended to
embarrass a witness, which might properly be denied, and cross-examination as to more serious
wrongdoing, which should be allowed:
Assaults upon a witness by cross-examination into collateral matters cannot be allowed
to gratify the caprice or the displeasure of those against whom he testifies; and
intrusions into private affairs, which are calculated merely to wound the feelings,
humiliate, or embarrass the witness, will not be permitted .... But a clear distinction
is to be taken between those matters ... and... matters, on the other hand, which are
calculated, in an important and material respect, to influence the credit to be given to
his testimony. As to the latter class, the witness cannot be shielded from disclosing his
own character on cross-examination, and for this purpose he may be interrogated upon
specific acts and transactions of his past life; and if they are not too remote in time, and
clearly relate to the credit of the witness, in an important and material respect, it would
be error to exclude them.
Id. at 1108 (citations omitted). The court did not distinguish between the witnesses' misconduct that
resulted in convictions and that which did not, holding both admissible. Id. at 1109. The court
stated: "[W]e think that the court committed serious error in so sustaining these objections we have
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Inconsistency within each method of impeachment continued in the twentieth
century during the years before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975. American courts, both state and federal, articulated a remarkably wide
range of ever-more nuanced standards for admission of both bad acts and
convictions.34 Not surprisingly, state and federal courts routinely issued
conflicting decisions as to whether particular misconduct or convictions could be
used to impeach.35
Some state courts articulated a very permissive standard of admissibility for
bad acts. In South Carolina, for example, a witness could be questioned about
"specific acts which tend to discredit the witness or impeach his moral
character;, 36 in Tennessee, about acts "involving moral turpitude, which disclose
his conduct, antecedents and character .... 'whether they relate to domestic
relations or other habits; "'37 and in New York, about "' any vicious or criminal act
of his life' that has a bearing on his credibility as a witness."38 Bad acts affected
credibility, according to the New York Court of Appeals, if they "revealed a
willingness or disposition . . . voluntarily to place the advancement of [a
witness's] individual self-interest ahead of principle or of the interests of
society."39
Other state courts articulated narrower standards. For example, the
Connecticut Supreme Court required that bad acts show "a lack of veracity and
not merely general bad character" ° and that the acts must "have a logical
tendency to indicate a lack of veracity."'" Decisions in Kansas and North Carolina
mentioned; We think it quite clear that the matters sought affected in an important degree the credit
of the witnesses, and it was entirely competent to attack their credibility in this way upon cross-
examination .. ." Id.
34See 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 416, at 162
(3d ed. 2000) ("Before 1975... there had been an astonishing variety of views among the federal
courts, as among American courts generally, on the impeachment of a witness by inquiry about
prior criminal convictions.").35See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.36Schreiberg v. So. Coating & Chem. Co., 97 S.E.2d 214,216 (S.C. 1957) (citation omitted).37State v. Jones, 385 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tenn. 1964) (quoting treatise and Zanone v. State, 36
S.W. 711, 715 (Tenn. 1896)). Arkansas also allowed a witness to be questioned "about his personal
habits and associates." Adams v. State, 318 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Ark. 1958).38People v. Sorge, 93 N.E.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. 1950) (quotation omitted).
39People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417 (N.Y. 1974).
'Vogel v. Sylvester, 174 A.2d 122, 127 (Conn. 1961); see also State v. Schutte, 117 A. 508,
512 (Conn. 1922) ("[C]ross-examination of a witness [sic] acts of misconduct tending merely to
show bad moral character in general are not admissible.")41Vogel, 174 A.2d at 127.
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appeared to limit questions to criminal conduct, although the violations of law
plainly did not have to be serious.
42
Federal courts also applied a wide range of standards for bad act
impeachment.43 Some federal courts did not allow impeachment unless the
misconduct resulted in a conviction.44 Others allowed questioning as to
misconduct that would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor amounting to crimen
falsi if prosecuted.45 Some courts allowed questioning about bad acts to impeach
only if the acts were not collateral; that is, if the proponent would be entitled to
prove the acts as a part of his or her case in chief.4 6 Finally, some federal courts
allowed very broad impeachment.47
Standards for impeachment by convictions also varied greatly among both
state and federal courts. The Utah Supreme Court provided a summary of the
different state approaches in State v. Johnson.48 Some jurisdictions allowed
impeachment with felonies, infamous crimes, and crimes involving moral
turpitude, but not with misdemeanors or minor offenses not involving infamy or
42See, e.g., State v. Killion, 148 P. 643, 645 (Kan. 1915) (stating that witness "may be
interrogated... in regard to his past conduct and character, to any altercations or offenses, and to
his having used dangerous weapons at other times"); State v. Neal, 23 S.E.2d 911, 912 (N.C. 1943)
(holding that defendant could be questioned "as to her various infractions of law, including cutting
affrays, larceny, vagrancy, nuisance, and violation of the prohibition law").
43See, e.g., United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1948) ("There is, indeed, a
conflict as to whether acts of misconduct not resulting in conviction are the proper subject of cross-
examination to impeach a witness.").
'See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 106 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1939) (recognizing similar
ruling); Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767,771 (8th Cir. 1960) ("[A]cts of prior misconduct on
the part of a witness not resulting in his conviction of a crime may not be delved into on cross-
examination, in an attempt to impeach the credibility of his testimony."); McKune v. United States,
296 F. 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1924) (recognizing similar ruling).
45See, e.g., United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1948). The court saw "no reason
why the standard should be less exacting where no conviction is involved." Id.
46See, e.g., Gideon v. United States, 52 F.2d 427,430 (8th Cir. 1931) (prohibiting questioning
about bad acts to impeach because acts were not subject of direct examination).
47The Tenth Circuit, for example, articulated the following standard:
[Q]uestions asked on cross-examination for the purposes of impeachment should be
confined to acts or conduct which reflect upon [the witness's] integrity or truthfulness,
or so "pertain to his personal turpitude, such as to indicate such moral depravity or
degeneracy on his part as would likely render him insensible to the obligations of an
oath to speak the truth."
Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178, 181 (10th Cir. 1931) (quoting Miller v. Territory of
Oklahoma, 149 F. 330, 338 (8th Cir. 1906)); see also Barnard v. Wabash R.R. Co., 208 F.2d 489,
497 (8th Cir. 1953) (permitting witness to be asked "whether he has committed particular wrongful
or immoral acts" (citations omitted)); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1941)
(permitting witness to be questioned "as to misconduct, even as to collateral matters, which has a
tendency to show his lack of honesty or truthfulness").
4287 P. 909 (Utah 1930).
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moral turpitude.49 Some states limited impeachment to felonies, while others
admitted all grades of offenses, or any crime involving moral turpitude.5" Finally,
some courts limited impeachment to the traditional categories of "treason, felony,
and crimenfalsi.'' 5' Different federal court approaches are summarized by Charles
A. Wright as follows:
Support could have been found in the federal cases for each of the
following positions: a witness may be impeached by inquiry about any
conviction of crime, whether felony or misdemeanor; felonies may be
shown but misdemeanors may not; only crimes involving moral
turpitude may be shown; any felony may be shown but misdemeanors
only if they involve moral turpitude; all felonies and those
misdemeanors amounting to crimenfalsi; or that only crimes resting on
dishonest conduct may be shown.52
Although the diverse standards in federal courts for impeachment by both
convictions and bad acts doubtless reflected genuine differences of opinion
among federal judges, in many cases the diversity was due to the fact that federal
courts applied state law. Thus, the state diversity was mirrored at the federal level.
With such a wide range of standards, it is not surprising that courts issued
flatly inconsistent rulings about the admissibility of specific bad acts and
convictions. As to bad acts, courts disagreed about cross-examination about acts
491d. at 913.
5 Id. In states where statutes permitted "conviction of crime" to be admitted, some courts
construed "crime" to include felonies and misdemeanors while others included only felonies and
nonfelonies "involving moral turpitude or depravity, or infamous in [their] nature." Id. at 914.
51Kornreich v. Indus. Fire Ins. Co., 5 N.E.2d 153, 158 (Ohio 1936).522A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 416, at 162-65 (citations omitted).
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of unchastity,53 marital infidelity,54 gambling,55 vagrancy,56 prostitution,57
assault,58 theft of property,59 having illegitimate children, 6° having unsavory
6 1associates, and liquor offenses.62 As to convictions, courts disagreed about the
53Compare Williams v. State, 2 S.W.2d 36,40 (Ark. 1927) (allowing cross-examination about
prior acts of unchastity), State v. Brooks, 165 N.W. 194, 198 (Iowa 1917) (same), State v.
McCombs, 181 P.2d 473, 477 (Kan. 1947) (same), and People v. Cutler, 163 N.W. 493, 495-96
(Mich. 1917) (same), with Sage v. State, 195 P. 533, 537 (Ariz. 1921) (prohibiting cross-
examination about prior acts of unchastity), State v. Knox, 18 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Iowa 1945) (same),
Annarina v. Boland, IIl A. 84, 89 (Md. 1920) (same), and Sherrick v. State, 61 N.W.2d 358, 361,
366 (Neb. 1953) (same).54Compare People v. Hunter, 160 N.E. 192, 193 (111. 1928) (allowing questions about marital
infidelity), and Vogel v. Sylvester, 174 A.2d 122, 127-28 (Conn. 1961) (same), with Ingram v.
United States, 106 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1939) (refusing to permit questions about marital
infidelity), State v. Schutte, 117 A. 508, 512 (Conn. 1922) (same), Kremis v. Kremis, 161 A. 255,
257 (Md. 1932) (same), and United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1973) (same).
55Compare State v. Fowler, 373 S.W.2d 460,466 (Tenn. 1963) (permitting cross-examination
about crooked gambling activities), with People v. Blockburger, 188 N.E. 440, 444 (111. 1933)
(holding cross-examination about betting on horses improper).56Compare State v. Neal, 23 S.E.2d 911,912 (N.C. 1943) (allowing question about vagrancy),
with Wardrope v. State, 340 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (prohibiting question about
prior drunk and disorderly conduct).
57Compare State v. Allen, 435 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. 1968) (allowing women to be asked
whether they are prostitutes), State v. Jones, 385 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tenn. 1964) (same), andCampbell
v. State, 230 S.W. 695, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (same), with McKune v. United States, 296 F.
480, 481 (9th Cir. 1924) (holding improper cross-examination of government witness as to being
prostitute).
"Compare State v. Killion, 148 P. 643, 645 (Kan. 1915) (allowing witness to be questioned
about prior assault), State v. Pfeifer, 56 P.2d 442, 444 (Kan. 1935) (same), State v. Flowers, 114
N.W.2d 78,82 (Minn. 1962) (same), and State v. Neal, 23 S.E.2d 911,912 (N.C. 1943) (same), with
Adams v. State, 318 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Ark. 1958) (prohibiting questions about prior assaults).
9Compare State v. Neal, 23 S.E.2d 911,912 (N.C. 1943) (permitting question about larceny),
with State v. Miller, 22 S.W.2d 642,644 (Mo. 1929) (prohibiting cross-examination of state witness
about prior recent theft of car).
6°Compare State ex rel. Emery v. Christensen, 294 P. 892, 894 (Kan. 1931) (allowing cross-
examination about having children out of wedlock), State v. Cruz, 285 P. 500, 500 (N.M. 1930)
(same), andMobley v. State, 232 S.W. 531, 535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (same), with Smiley
v. State, 118 S.E. 713, 714 (Ga. 1923) (prohibiting questions about having illegitimate children),
and Moore v. United States, 394 F.2d 818, 819 (5th Cir. 1968) (same).61Compare State v. Quinn, 243 N.W. 70, 74 (Minn. 1932) (allowing cross-examination as to
defendant's life history, including gang connections), with Sights v. State, 166 P. 458, 460 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1917) (holding cross-examination of witness as being associate of prostitutes and
bootleggers improper).62Compare Denny v. State, 129 N.E. 308,309 (Ind. 1921) (allowing cross-examination about
liquor offenses), State v. Sherry, 64 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Mo. 1933) (same), State v. Colson, 139 S.E.
230, 231 (N.C. 1927) (same), and Strickland v. State, 284 P. 651, 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930)
(same), with State v. Umphalbaugh, 228 N.W. 266,267 (Iowa 1929) (forbidding questioning about
liquor offenses), State v. Ross, 267 S.W. 853, 854 (Mo. 1924) (same), Wisdom v. State, 193 P.
1003, 1004 (Okla. Crim. App. 1920) (same), and Schreiberg v. S. Coatings & Chem. Co., 97 S.E.2d
214, 216-17 (S.C. 1957) (same).
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admissibility of convictions for speeding and other traffic offenses, 63 driving
while intoxicated,64 disorderly conduct (and drunkenness),65 assault,66 and
larceny.67
As in earlier times, there was more consistency between the methods of
impeachment than there was within each method. Judges taking a broad view
allowed cross-examiners to raise any act or conviction that involved moral
turpitude or generally was viewed as wrong or unsavory.68 Judges taking a more
restrictive view tended to exclude relatively minor misconduct and less serious
convictions.69 Almost all courts allowed impeachment with serious criminal
misconduct, whether it resulted in a conviction7° or not.71 Finally, courts
63Compare Way v. State, 66 N.E.2d 608,610 (Ind. 1946) (allowing cross-examination about
conviction for speeding), and State v. Cox, 333 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Mo. 1960) (allowing cross-
examination about conviction for driving without license), with Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co. v.
Richardson, 236 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Ark. 1951) (refusing to admit conviction for speeding), and
Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 75 A.2d 339, 341 (Md. 1950) (refusing to allow cross-
examination of plaintiff about convictions for traffic offenses).
'Compare McMullen v. Cannon, 150 N.E.2d 765, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958) (allowing
questions about conviction for driving while intoxicated), with Souden v. Johnson, 125 N.W.2d 742
(Minn. 1963) (disallowing questions about convictions for drunk driving), and Thomas v. Devine,
140 A. 324, 325 (N.J. 1928) (same).65Compare Way v. State, 66 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 1946) (allowing impeachment with
disorderly conduct conviction), and State v. Lafferty, 415 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. 1967) (admitting
conviction for drunkenness), with People v. Beard, 214 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)
(holding conviction for disorderly conduct not admissible because not infamous crime), State v.
Block, 196 A. 225, 229 (N.J. 1938) (holding conviction as disorderly person inadmissible), and
State v. Johnson, 287 P. 909, 914 (Utah 1930) (holding conviction for drunkenness not admissible
because only misdemeanor).
66Compare State v. Rodia, 39 A.2d 484, 486 (N.J. 1944) (allowing impeachment with prior
assault convictions), and State v. Reese, 192 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (same), with
Green v. State, 155 A. 164, 168 (Md. 1931) (holding assault conviction properly excluded).67Compare Caldwell v. State, 213 So.2d 919, 926 (Ala. 1968) (admitting prior larceny
conviction for impeachment), State v. Lafferty, 415 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Mo. 1967) (same), and
Commonwealth v. Gold, 38 A.2d 486,489 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (same), with Sibley v. Jeffreys, 264
P.2d 831, 834 (Ariz. 1953) (refusing to allow impeachment with prior larceny conviction), and
People v. Birdette, 177 N.E.2d 170, 172-73 (111. 1961) (same).
68See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
69See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.70See, e.g., People v. Davis, 107 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ill. 1952) (admitting conviction for armed
robbery); Taylor v. State, 174 A.2d 573, 575 (Md. 1961) (allowing defendant to be cross-examined
about conviction for assault with deadly weapon); Green v. State, 155 A. 164, 167 (Md. 1931)
(admitting evidence of prior rape conviction).71See, e.g., Barnard v. Wabash R.R. Co., 208 F.2d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 1953); Gaines v. State,
186 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Ark. 1945) (allowing cross-examination about whether defendant had shot
two persons on another occasion); State v. Archer, 255 P. 396, 400 (N.M. 1927) (permitting
questioning about prior shooting); Janeway v. State, 71 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Okla. Crim. App. 1937)
(allowing cross-examination about witness's prior robberies).
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continued to follow the rule that prior convictions could be proven with extrinsic
evidence, if necessary,72 while prior bad acts could not.73
B. Early Attempts at Codification
Amidst the common law discord, reformers suggested limits on impeachment
with convictions. The Model Code of Evidence, issued by the American Law
Institute in 1942, provided that an accused could not be impeached with a
conviction unless he first introduced evidence "for the sole purpose of supporting
his credibility. '' 74 This provision allowed an accused to avoid the "harsh
dilemma"75 of testifying and seeing his prior record "doom his defense '76 or not
testifying and being seen as a guilty person with something to hide.77 Witnesses
other than an accused, by contrast, could be broadly impeached on cross-
examination or by extrinsic evidence "concerning any conduct by him and any
other matter relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a witness. 7 1
72See, e.g., Coulston v. United States, 51 F.2d 178, 181-82 (10th Cir. 1931) (permitting prior
conviction to be proven by extrinsic evidence); Oklahoma ex rel. Nesbitt v. Allied Materials Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 130, 132 (W.D. Okla. 1968) (same); State v. Price, 160 N.W. 677, 681 (Minn. 1916)
(same); People v. Sorge, 93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. 1950) (same); State v. Johnson, 287 P. 909,913
(Utah 1930) (same).73See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 276 (3d Cir. 1959) (stating that prior bad
act may not be proven with extrinsic evidence); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 85 (4th Cir.
1941) (same); Gideon v. United States, 52 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1931) (same); People v. Sorge,
93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (N.Y. 1950) (same); State v. Jones, 385 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tenn. 1964) (same).74See MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106(3) (1942). The rule read: "If an accused who testifies at
the trial introduces no evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility, no evidence
concerning his commission or conviction of crime shall, for the sole purpose of impairing his
credibility, be elicited on his cross-examination or be otherwise introduced against him . I... d
711 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 42.761d
77MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 106 cmt., at 128-29.781d. R. 106(1). The only exception, oddly enough, was that extrinsic evidence was not
admissible to prove any conviction not involving dishonesty or false statement. See id R. 106(1)(b).
The relevant portion of the rule read:
[F]or the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party..
. may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him
and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a witness ... except
that extrinsic evidence shall be inadmissible ... (b) [to prove] his conviction of crime
not involving dishonesty or false statement.
Id. The rule allowed cross-examination of a witness other than an accused regarding his conviction
for any crime, so long as the court believed it was "relevant upon the issue of his credibility," and
allowed extrinsic evidence to be admitted to prove a crimenfalsi conviction. Id.
There is some indication in the comments to Rule 106 that the authors believed they were
limiting impeachment of witnesses other than an accused to convictions that involved dishonesty
or false statement. For example, the comments state that "[Clause] (b) of Paragraph (1) definitely
confine[s] evidence of crime to matters having to do rather directly with credibility." Id. cmt., at
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In language similar to the Model Code, Rule 20 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence79 permitted broad impeachment of a witness either upon cross-
examination or with extrinsic evidence as to any conduct a court deemed relevant
to credibility.8" Subsequent provisions carved out exceptions. Rule 21 provided
that an accused could not be impeached with any prior conviction unless the
accused first introduced evidence solely to support credibility.8 Rule 21 also
appeared to bar impeachment of witnesses other than an accused with convictions
that did not involve dishonesty or false statement.82 The Model Code and the
Uniform Rules marked the beginning of the modem practice of distinguishing
more sharply between the methods of impeachment. Although restricting
impeachment with convictions, both the Model Code and the Uniform Rules
allowed any witness, including a criminal defendant, to be asked on cross-
examination about any misconduct relevant to credibility.83 It is surprising no
119. The comments also state that "Clause (b) of Paragraph (1) limit[s] . .. [t]he type of crime
evidence of the conviction of which is admissible to impair the credibility of any witness [to] that
which involves dishonesty or false statement." Id. at 122. Unfortunately, this language is
ambiguous. It is unclear whether the authors meant only to prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence
except for crimenfalsi convictions or whether they meant to bar cross-examination concerning non-
crimenfalsi convictions as well. In any event, regardless of what the authors of the rule meant to
say, what they said is as set forth above.
79The Uniform rules were drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and approved at its Annual Conference in 1953.
80UNiF. R. EVID. 20 (1953) (superseded 1974). The rule read: "[F]or the purpose of impairing
or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party... may examine him and introduce extrinsic
evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of
credibility." The language is nearly identical to the language of Model Rule 106(1). See supra note
78.
"See UNIF. R. EVID. 21 (1953) (superseded 1974), which read in part: "If the witness be the
accused in a criminal proceeding, no evidence of his conviction of a crime shall be admissible for
the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible
solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility."82Rule 21 provided that "Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving
dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his credibility." Id.
While this language might be read to prohibit both cross-examination and introduction of extrinsic
evidence concerning non-crimenfalsi convictions of witnesses other than the accused, the comment
to the rule raises some doubt. It reads: "This rule is the same as the Model Code." Id. cmt., at 175.
Rule 106(b) (1) of the Model Code merely prohibited introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove
non-crimenfalsi convictions of witnesses other than the accused and did not bar cross-examination
about such crimes. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. And, as noted above, the
comments to Rule 106(b)(1) were ambiguous on this point. See supra note 78.
83The Model Code provided that a witness could be examined "concerning any conduct by
him and any other matter relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a witness." MODEL CODE OF
EVID. R. 106(1). The Code did forbid prior conduct to be proven by extrinsic evidence. See id.
R.106(1)(c). The Uniform Rules contained very similar language, allowing a witness to be
examined "concerning any conduct by him and any other matter relevant upon the issues of
credibility." UNIF. R. EvID. 20. The Uniform Rules also appeared to disallow proof of bad acts with
extrinsic evidence. See id. 22(d). The language of Rule 22(d) might be read somewhat more broadly
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attempt was made to restrict impeachment with bad acts because bad acts pose the
same dangers of unfair prejudice as convictions.
The Model Code of Evidence was not adopted by any jurisdiction,84 and only
a few states adopted modified versions of the Uniform Rules.85 Nonetheless, these
reform efforts influenced subsequent developments. For example, Rule 106 of the
Model Code and Uniform Rule 21 were cited with approval in the influential case
of Luck v. United States.86 A District of Columbia Code provision stated that a
witness's prior conviction "may be given in evidence to affect his credibility as
a witness."87 Luck interpreted the provision to give trial courts discretion to bar
impeachment where the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed probative value
or where an accused would be deterred from testifying.88 Gordon v. United
States89 refined Luck by detailing the factors a trial judge should consider in
exercising discretion. The factors were: (1) whether the prior conviction rested
directly on dishonest conduct; (2) whether the conviction was remote or recent;
(3) whether the conviction and the crime charged were similar; (4) the need for
to restrict cross-examination as to bad acts as well. The rule reads: "[Elvidence of specific instances
of [a witness's] conduct relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be
inadmissible." Id. Because the immediately preceding clause in Rule 22(c) specifically refers to
character for honesty or veracity as one trait of a person's character, see id. 22(c), and because
"evidence" might be a question on cross-examination in addition to extrinsic evidence, the rule
might be read to ban bad act impeachment of witnesses. It seems unlikely, however, that this result
was intended. The comment to Rule 22(d) reads: "Clause (d), as contrasted to Rule 46, prohibits
proof of specific instances of conduct to prove a character trait where the purpose is impeachment."
Id. 22(d) cmt. This language appears to restate the traditional rule that extrinsic evidence of bad acts
is not admissible to prove the witness has a poor character for truthfulness, i.e., to impeach
credibility. Rule 46 of the Uniform Rules, like Federal Rule 405(b), allows admission of specific
instances of conduct in the relatively rare cases where a trait of character is an essential element of
a charge, claim, or defense. Id 46. In such cases, of course, the evidence will usually be extrinsic
because it is not being brought out through cross-examination of a witness but as a part of a party's
case-in-chief. In any event, it seems unlikely that the authors of the Uniform Rules intended to
overturn hundreds of years of practice allowing more or less impeachment by acts without some
clear statement to that effect.84See John R. Schmertz, Jr., The First Decade Under Article VI of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Some Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1367,
1368 n.2 (1985); Robert G. Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps Backward, 1 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 247, 252 (1970).
85Schmertz, supra note 84, at 1368 n.2; Spector, supra note 84, at 252.
86348 F.2d 763, 768 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Sternback, 402 F.2d 353,
356 (7th Cir. 1968) (stating, in individual opinion, that Uniform Rule 21 "is sound policy and ought
to be adopted by legislation or exercise ofjudicial rule making power"); United States v. Palumbo,
401 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1968) (mentioning but declining to adopt standards of Model Code Rule
106 and Uniform Rule 21).
87See Act of Dec. 23, 1963, ch. 3, § 14-305, 77 Stat. 519.
88Luck, 348 F.2d at 767-68.
89383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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the defendant's testimony; and (5) the importance of the issue of credibility.9"
Although Congress subsequently amended the District of Columbia Code to
overrule Luck and Gordon,9 1 several other circuits accepted Luck-Gordon's
discretionary approach.92
C. Enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence
The impulse to codify continued despite the unhappy fate of the Model Code
and the Uniform Rules.93 A Special Committee appointed by Chief Justice Earl
Warren concluded that uniform evidence rules for the federal courts were
"advisable and feasible." 94 Subsequently, the Judicial Conference recommended
that the Chief Justice appoint an Advisory Committee to draft rules.95 On March
8, 1965, the Committee was appointed.96
The Advisory Committee faced a daunting task, and no problem was more
difficult than articulating generally acceptable standards for impeachment by
convictions and bad acts. Given the widely disparate views concerning both
methods of impeachment that had existed for over 200 years, it is hardly
surprising that the rule-makers, and, subsequently, legislators, were unable to
agree upon a specific set of standards. Commentators almost universally
9°Id. at 940-41.
91See Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 133, 84 Stat. 473, 550-51.
92See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that trial
judge may bar use of prior convictions to impeach defendant ifjudge "finds that a prior conviction
negates credibility only slightly but creates a substantial chance of unfair prejudice, taking into
account such factors as the nature of the conviction, its bearing on veracity, its age, and its
propensity to influence the minds of the jurors improperly"); United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d
328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967) (stating that "court may impose limits on the cross-examination of a
witness, especially a defendant, when there is reason to apprehend that the prejudicial effect of the
earlier convictions sought to be adduced will outweigh their possible probative force in impeaching
credibility"); see also Sears v. United States, 490 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Palumbo
factors with approval).
93See Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of
Evidence for the Federal Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 81-82 (1962) [hereinafter Preliminary Study], for
a review of the recommendations of various official bodies that uniform evidence rules be adopted
for the federal courts.
94Preliminary Study, supra note 93, at 77.
9'1963 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
20. The Judicial Conference acted upon the recommendation of its Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure.
9621 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5006, at 98 (1977). Albert E. Jenner, Jr., a distinguished practitioner, was appointed Chairman,
and Professor Edward W. Cleary, a leading expert on evidence law, was appointed Reporter. Id.
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characterize the final versions of Rules 608(b) and 609 as compromises.97 This is
a very charitable characterization. Congress didn't compromise; it copped out. A
compromise is an agreement upon an intermediate position between conflicting
claims or principles.9" Congress did not agree upon a specific intermediate
position between those favoring wide-open impeachment and those favoring little
or no impeachment, nor did Congress define what misconduct or crimes bear on
credibility. Instead, Congress adopted rules with such general standards that
federal judges could continue to permit whatever sort of impeachment they had
allowed before the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, no matter what their
position on the impeachment spectrum.
Disagreements surfaced early. Rule 6-09(a) of the Preliminary Draft of the
Federal Rules made admissible all felony convictions and all convictions for
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. 99 Stung by criticism that Rule
97See, e.g., Edward E. Gainor, Character Evidence by Any Other Name...: A Proposal to
Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction Under Rule 609,58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 763 (1990)
(characterizing Rule 609 as "the product of hard-fought political compromise"); Victor Gold,
Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2296 (1994) (stating that Rule 609 "strikes a compromise between sharply
conflicting policies"); Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal
Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 541 (1992) (stating that "the Rule as
originally enacted was a 'political compromise' between the discretionary approach embodied in
Luck and the mandatory admissibility prevalent in the federal and state courts"); R. Michael Smith,
Impeaching the Merits: Rule 609(a)(1) and Civil Plaintiffs, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 441, 444 (1987)
("[T]he version of Rule 609(a) that emerged from the Conference Committee was the result of a
compromise within the legislature."); Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the "Balancing" Provision ofRule
609(a), 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 917 (1980) (stating that in final version of Rule 609, Congress
"consciously and deliberately struck a 'political compromise' between two widely divergent
positions"); Irving Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 11 (1976) (stating that Federal Rules of Evidence struck political
compromise); see also United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that
"current language of the Rule is unquestionably the product of careful deliberation and
compromise").
98RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 421 (2d ed. 1987).
99Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295-96 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. The draft rule stated:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.
Id. Neither the text of this rule nor the Advisory Committee's Note made clear whether a court had
discretion to prohibit impeachment with a conviction that fit within the terms of the rule. The rule
says only that evidence "is admissible," not that it must be admitted. See id. The Advisory
Committee's Note set forth various alternatives it had considered in drafting Rule 6-09(a), one of
which was to "[l]eave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge."Id. at 299. The Note cited Luck-
Gordon in support of this approach, but then stated that subsequent decisions attempting to set
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609(a) did not provide for exclusion of convictions to avoid unfair prejudice, the
Advisory Committee obligingly added such a provision °° and enthusiastically
endorsed the Luck-Gordon approach in a revised Note.'' This change evoked an
angry response from Senator McClellan, who saw it as "a direct assault on the
will of Congress"' 2 as expressed in the recent amendment to the District of
Columbia Code explicitly rejecting Luck-Gordon. °3 Chastened, the Advisory
Committee quickly retreated to the original version of the rule," and it was this
version the Supreme Court submitted to Congress.'0 5
While the Advisory Committee may have been intimidated by Senator
McClellan, the House Judiciary Committee plainly was not. A subcommittee
added a provision to Rule 609(a) giving a court discretion to exclude a felony
conviction if the court determined that "the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs
the probative value of the evidence of the conviction."' 6 The full Committee went
guidelines were "subject to ... deficiencies." Id. This language could be read to prohibit a court
from exercising discretion to exclude a conviction.
'See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates,
51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) [hereinafter Revised Draft]. The revised rule stated:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines
that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.
'
0I1 d. at 392-93.
'
02See 117 CONG. REC. 29,894 (1971) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
'°
3See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Senator McClellan stated:
I find it incredible that within less than 8 months after the Congress fully considered
and decisively rejected the Luck rule for the District of Columbia,... the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure is now proposing that the Luck rule be
adopted as the law of the land and applied in every Federal district court in the country.
Apparently, the committee paid no attention to the congressional judgment on this
matter.
Id. at 29,895. The Senator was so angry that he proposed legislation to restrict the delegation of
power to the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of procedure. Id. at 29,894.
'0428 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6131,
at 149 (1993).
...See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,269 (1972)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Draft].
116Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings]. The
subcommittee's note made clear its intent that this discretion only extended to felonies and not to
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. Id.
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even further, allowing impeachment only by crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement.10
7
The debate of Rule 609(a) on the House floor reflected different views. Issue
was joined when Representative Hogan offered an amendment substituting the
Supreme Court version of Rule 609(a) for the Judiciary Committee version."0 8 In
support, he made the traditional argument in favor of wide-open impeachment:
Obviously, the character of a witness is material circumstantial evidence
on the question of the veracity of the witness. Prior criminal conduct,
including all prior felony convictions, is relevant evidence of such
character....
... Should a witness with an antisocial background be allowed to stand
on the same basis of believability before juries as law-abiding citizens
with unblemished records? I think not.
"A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in conduct in
disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willingness to give
false testimony."'0 9
Representative Dennis argued the contrary view. He stressed the "grievous
dilemma""0 faced by a criminal defendant.' and accused the amendment's
supporters of"want[ing] to try people just because you think they are bad actors,
and you ought to throw them in jail just on general principles... -112 Ultimately
the House defeated the Hogan amendment and adopted Rule 609(a) as proposed
by the Judiciary Committee.' 13
Disagreement about Rule 609(a) continued in the Senate. The Senate
Judiciary Committee proposed that an accused be impeachable only with
convictions involving dishonesty or false statement and that other witnesses could
be impeached with any felony, unless the court determined that prejudice
10 7See 120 CONG. REC. 2,374 (1974). The rule was revised to read: "(a) General rule. - For
the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
is admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement."
'
081d. at 2,375-77.
'091d. at 2,376 (quoting first draft of Advisory Committee's Note on Rule 609). Representative
Lott made a similar argument. See id. at 2,381.
"See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
1,"'[P]eople are either frightened off the stand, and do not tell their story, or else they take the
stand and are crucified by being asked about entirely irrelevant offenses." 120 CONG. REC. at 2,377.
112]d.
'
3Id. at 2,381.
No. 2]
654 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2003:635
outweighed probity." 4 Senator McClellan offered an amendment on the Senate
floor making all felonies and any crime involving dishonesty or false statement
admissible against any witness, including an accused, and deleting any reference
to exclusion for unfair prejudice." 5 During the floor debate, Senators made the
familiar arguments for and against impeachment with prior convictions. Senator
McClellan argued that serious crimes bear directly on a witness's willingness to
lie;" 6 others countered by pointing to an accused's grievous dilemma'17 and the
futility of instructions directing jurors to consider the prior crime only as bearing
on credibility. 8 McClellan's amendment was accepted by a very close margin. 9
The Conference Committee faced "the task of reconciling the two versions
of Rule 609(a) which, from all those proposed, defined the scope of admissibility
most narrowly and most broadly."'2 ° The Committee responded by proposing a
11
4See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 3 (1974). The proposed rule read:
(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime may be elicited from him or established by public
record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) involved dishonesty or false
statement or (2) in the case of witnesses other than the accused, was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, but only if the court determines that the probative value of admitting the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Id.
"1120 CONG. REC. at 37,075-76 (statement of Sen. McClellan). The proposed revision read:
(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted . . .if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which he
was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment.
Id. The Rule as submitted by the Supreme Court stated that "evidence that he has been convicted
of a crime is admissible," 56 F.R.D. at 269 (emphasis added), while Senator McClellan's
amendment stated that "evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted," 120
CONG. REC. at 37,075 (emphasis added). This change suggests that the Senator wanted to eliminate
discretion to exclude prior convictions.
11
6The Senator stated:
Surely a person who has committed a serious crime-a felony-will just as readily lie
under oath as someone who has committed a misdemeanor involving lying.... The fact
that a person has committed such a serious offense in the past clearly bears on whether
he would lie under oath where his life or liberty was in jeopardy.
120 CONG. REc. at 37,076-77 (statement of Sen. McClellan).
1
17Senators Kennedy and Abourezk made this argument. Id. at 37,080-82 (statements of Sen.
Kennedy & Sen. Abourezk).
'See id. at 37,078 (statement of Sen. Hart) ("I do not think one has to have spent a lifetime
in criminal litigation to know that we are kidding ourselves if we think that the instruction removes
the poison.").
91d at 37,083 (reporting 38 yes, 33 no, and 29 not voting).
2
°WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6131, at 165.
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rule that essentially left the entire matter in the discretion of trial courts,' 2 ' and this
version ultimately was enacted by Congress. The rule read as follows:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.122
This language is very vague and general; several perplexing issues are
unresolved. Most obviously, the rule gives no guidance for deciding whether the
probative value of a conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. 23 What factors
should a court consider in making that determination? Should it consider the
Luck-Gordon factors 124 or some other factors? Are some felonies more probative
of truthfulness than others, or are all felony convictions probative of truthfulness?
The rule does not answer these questions. 125
In addition, it is unclear who may invoke the probity/prejudice balancing.
The rule says a court must determine that "the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,"'26 but it does not
specify whether "defendant" is limited to an accused or also includes the
defendant in a civil case. 27 Nor does the rule indicate whether witnesses or parties
'21See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974).
122FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975) (amended 1990).
'
23See Gainor, supra note 97, at 779 ("Neither Rule 609 nor its legislative history provide
courts with any guidance in how to determine whether the probative value of a prior conviction
introduced in evidence for impeachment outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.").
124See supra notes 86, 89, 90 and accompanying text.
125Other sections of Rule 609 provide some guidance on ancillary issues. Section (d) states
that evidence of juvenile adjudications generally is inadmissible; however, a court has discretion
in a criminal case to admit a juvenile adjudication to impeach a witness other than the accused "if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is
satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence." FED. R. EvID. 609(d) (1975). Section (b) states that evidence of a conviction is not
admissible if more than ten years have elapsed from the date of conviction or the date of release
from prison, but even here, a court has discretion to admit the conviction if it determines, "in the
interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect." Id. 609(b).
'
261d. 609(a).
'
27The Conference Report contains a hint that the Conference Committee meant to limit
probity/prejudice weighing to defendants in criminal cases. At the end of a long paragraph talking
about prejudice to the defendant without specifying whether "defendant" includes civil as well as
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other than a defendant may block impeachment by invoking Rule 403, which
allows relevant evidence to be excluded "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'
128
Finally, the rule fails to specify which crimes involve dishonesty or false
statement. The issue is important because the rule allows impeachment with
felonies and misdemeanors in this category and because the Conference Report
makes clear that such crimes are automatically admissible against any witness
without any probity/prejudice balancing. 29 The Conference Report, however,
does not adequately explain which crimes qualify. While the Report specifies
several crimes that involve dishonesty or false statement, 3° it also includes a
general catch-all of "any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the
commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or
falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully."''
Historically, there has been little agreement on which crimes are crimenfalsi.32
Consequently, by failing to define the term, Congress left the federal courts to
choose among the diverse common law views. 133
criminal defendants, the Report states: "Such evidence should only be excluded where it presents
a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict
the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record." H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974)
(emphasis added).
128FED. R. EViD. 403.
129H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 9-10 (1974). On this point, at least, the Conference Report is
clear. It states:
The admission of prior convictions involving dishonesty and false statement is not
within the discretion of the Court. Such convictions are peculiarly probative of
credibility and, under this rule, are always to be admitted. Thus, judicial discretion
granted with respect to the admissibility of other prior convictions is not applicable to
those involving dishonesty or false statement.
Id. Neither the text of the rule nor the Conference Report, however, address whether Rule 403 may
be invoked to bar use of a conviction involving dishonesty or false statement.
'
3 The Conference Report included the crimes of "perjury or subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, [and] false pretense." Id.
13Id.
132See supra note 22.
"'
33Representative Hogan described the range of views on this issue during the House floor
debate on Rule 609:
What, really, is dishonesty or false statement in judicial or legal terms? Unless one
practices in a jurisdiction which has statutorily defined crimenfalsi, the common law
definition of "any crime which may injuriously affect the administration of justice, by
the introduction of falsehood and fraud" is applicable. This definition has been held to
include forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery,
conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness or to accuse of crime, obtaining money
under false pretenses, stealing, moral turpitude, shoplifting, intoxication, petit larceny,
jury tampering, embezzlement and filing a false estate tax return. In otherjurisdictions,
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Faced with the vague and ambiguous standards of Rule 609(a), federal
judges could in good faith continue to follow whatever approach they had
followed before the rule was enacted. A judge who believed that virtually any
criminal conviction is highly probative of credibility and should be admissible to
impeach any witness, including a criminal defendant, could continue to allow
such impeachment in almost all cases. As to an accused, the judge could simply
find that probative value outweighed prejudicial effect. As to all other witnesses,
the judge could reasonably read the rule to mandate admission of any prior felony
conviction by interpreting "defendant" to mean only a criminal defendant and by
construing the phrase "shall be admitted" to bar use of Rule 403 by any party or
witness other than an accused. Finally, the judge could allow impeachment with
many misdemeanors by broadly interpreting "dishonesty and false statement,"
although a judge would stretch the limits of good faith by allowing impeachment
with misdemeanors that involved little premeditation, such as assault.
By contrast, ajudge who believed that few criminal convictions are probative
of credibility and that the danger of unfair prejudice to parties and witnesses is
high could easily continue to prohibit impeachment in almost all cases. As to an
accused, thejudge could routinely decide that probity did not outweigh prejudice.
The judge could reasonably apply the same balancing to a defendant in a civil
case or could grant all witnesses other than an accused the protections of Rule
403. Finally, the judge could limit the definition of crimes involving dishonesty
or false statement to the short list in the Conference Report 134 and allow automatic
impeachment only with those relatively rare crimes and deny admission of almost
all misdemeanors.
Rule 608(b) also provoked controversy, although not as much as Rule 609.135
The conflicting viewpoints on the proper scope of bad act impeachment resulted
in a rule with even fewer standards than Rule 609(a). Rule 608(b) leaves this form
of impeachment entirely to the trial judge's discretion. Some commentators
contend that the drafters and legislators intended Rule 608(b) to be narrowly
construed.3 6 There is, however, virtually no support for this view in either the
some of these same offenses have been found not to fit the crimenfalsi definition.
120 CONG. REC. 2,376 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan).34The list included perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
embezzlement, and false pretense. See id.
1
35See Okun, supra note 97, at 544 (1992) (asserting that "Rule 608(b) was the subject of
much less debate than Rule 609"); Schmertz, supra note 84, at 1425 (stating that "rule 609 received
a far greater share of time and attention by Congress than did rule 608(b)").
'
36See, e.g., 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 608.22(2)(c)(i), at 608-56 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997) (asserting that "Rule 608(b)
is intended to be restrictive" and "restrictively interpreted by trial courts"); I MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 16, § 41 (suggesting that particular acts of conduct satisfying Rule 608(b)
will normally involve dishonesty and false statement as under Rule 609(a)(2)); Okun, supra note
97, at 545 (asserting that Rule 608(b) "limits impeachment by specific instances of misconduct to
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language or legislative history of Rule 608(b). There were attempts to tighten up
the language of the rule, but the attempts failed due to pressure from the Justice
Department and the opposition of legislators.
The Preliminary Draft of Rule 608(b) 137 allowed wide-open impeachment by
prior bad acts.' Any specific instances of a witness's conduct could be raised as
long as they were "relevant to truthfulness."' 39 If one took the broad view of
conduct that bears on credibility,14 ° all manner of past conduct could be raised.'41
The proposed rule did contain the traditional limitation that the bad acts could not
be proved by extrinsic evidence, and it made specific reference to Rules 4-03 and
6-11, both of which gave courts discretion to exclude evidence. 1
42
Perhaps due to concerns of unfair prejudice, 143 the Revised Draft added the
requirement that the misconduct be "clearly probative of truthfulness or
instances that are directly relevant to the witness' character for truthfulness," while Rule 609(a)(1)
allows impeachment with convictions "that bear only a marginal relationship to the witness'
veracity").
'
37Rule 608(b) was designated as Rule 6-08(c) in the Preliminary Draft. See Preliminary Draft,
supra note 99, at 293.
13 8The draft rule stated:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 6-09, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if relevant to truthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness himself or on cross-examination of
a witness who testifies to an opinion of his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
subject to the general limitations upon relevant evidence in Rule 4-03 and the
limitations upon interrogation in Rule 6-11.
Id. 139id
'
4 The New York courts, for example, allow questioning about any act that reveals "a
willingness or disposition ... voluntarily to place the advancement of... individual self-interest
ahead of principle or the interests of society," People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377 (1974), and
the Tennessee courts allow questions about acts "involving moral turpitude, which disclose [a
witness's] antecedents and character.., whether they relate to domestic relations or other habits,"
State v. Jones, 385 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tenn. 1964).
'a1See supra notes 130, 133 and accompanying text (citing cases that allow questions as to
unchastity, marital infidelity, gambling, vagrancy, prostitution, assault, theft of property, having
illegitimate children, keeping bad company, and liquor offenses).
14:Preliminary Draft, supra note 99, at 293. The Advisory Committee's Note spoke only
briefly about the provision for impeachment by bad acts. The Note recognized that "the possibilities
of abuse are substantial" and purported to erect "safeguards." Id. at 295. The only safeguards
mentioned, however, are the requirement that the misconduct be relevant to truthfulness and the
protections of Rules 4-03 and 6-11. Id. Rules 4-03 and 6-11 gave a court broad discretion to exclude
evidence and limit questioning, but only if a judge believed that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed probative value or that questioning was taking too much time or would
subject a witness to harassment or undue embarrassment. See id. Thus, these supposed safeguards
did little to limit cross-examination by prior bad acts if a judge sincerely believed a broad range of
prior conduct is relevant to credibility and that jurors need this information to reach a just verdict.
143See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6111, at 13-14.
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untruthfulness and not remote in time.""' Although the explicit reference to Rules
403 and 611 was dropped, the Advisory Committee Note made plain that these
rules still applied.145 The Revised Draft also added the last sentence of Rule
608(b) stating that giving testimony does not waive the right against self-
incrimination when a witness is questioned about matters relating only to
credibility. 4
6
Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Senator McClellan both
sent letters criticizing the new provision that prior misconduct must be "clearly
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not remote in time.' ' 147 Both argued
the provision conflicted with the long-accepted standard that conduct need only
be relevant to truthfulness. They also suggested that timeliness questions were
best left to the discretion of the trial court. 148 The Judicial Conference Draft
responded by dropping the word "clearly" from the new provision. 149 Deputy
Attorney General Kleindienst wrote Chief Justice Burger objecting to the
requirement that the misconduct be "not remote in time, ' but the Court rebuffed
the objection and sent Rule 608 to Congress as proposed in the Judicial
Conference Draft.'51
The Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee was aware of the
objections of Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst and Senator McClellan,'5 and
it made some changes to the Supreme Court Draft. First, the Subcommittee
'"Revised Draft, supra note 100, at 389.
'See id. at 390 (referring to in Advisory Committee's Note the "overriding protection" of
Rules 403 and 611). Wright and Gold surmise that the drafters made this change to avoid implying
that by not mentioning Rules 403 and 611 in the text of other rules, the drafters intended that they
not apply to other rules. WRIGHT& GOLD, supra note 104 § 6111, at 14.
'"See Revised Draft, supra note 100, at 389. The sentence reads: "The giving of testimony,
whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the
witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate
only to credibility." See id. This language was not changed by Congress. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra
note 104, § 6111, at 14 n.17.
'1117 Cong. Rec. 33,655 (1971) (letter from Deputy Attorney General Richard G.
Kleindienst) [hereinafter Kleindienst Letter]; id. at 33,645 (letter from Sen. John L. McClellan)
[hereinafter McClellan Letter].
'48See Kleindienst Letter, supra note 147, at 33,649; McClellan Letter, supra note 147, at
33,645.
14'WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6111, at 17. This version of Rule 608(b) then read:
"Specific instances of the conduct of a witness . . . may . . . if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness and not remote in time, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness himself
. . . ." Id.
I5 Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 42, 45, 47 (1973) (letter
from Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger).
5
'See Supreme Court Draft, supra note 105, at 267.
152 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6111, at 22 n.3 1.
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dropped the language barring past misconduct that was remote in time. 53 Second,
it added the phrase "in the discretion of the court," so the second sentence of Rule
608(b) now reads: "[Specific instances of conduct] may, however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired
into on cross-examination."'
' 54
Jack Weinstein and Margaret Berger contend these changes show Congress
wanted trial courts to interpret Rule 608(b) restrictively.' This contention,
however, is very difficult to sustain. An amendment that merely gives a court
discretion to admit evidence does not make a rule more restrictive unless the
evidence was considered automatically, or at least presumptively, admissible
before the amendment. The repeated references to Rules 403 and 611 in the early
drafts of 608(b), however, show the drafters intended all along that courts could
bar impeachment by bad acts when the danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed probity or cross-examination would unduly harass or embarrass a
witness. Moreover, because of the potential for bad act impeachment to get out
of hand, the traditional American rule was that such impeachment was in the
discretion of the trial judge.'56 Thus, it is more reasonable to infer that the addition
1
53House Hearings, supra note 106, at 164-65 (First Committee Print, Rule 608(b)).
541d. The Subcommittee also attempted to clarify language that allowed a questioner to ask
a character witness testifying under Rule 608(a) about bad acts of the person as to whose character
for truthfulness the witness was testifying. The Supreme Court Draft allowed specific instances of
conduct to be inquired into "on cross-examination of the witness himself or on cross-examination
of a witness who testifies to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Supreme Court Draft,
supra note 105, at 267. The Subcommittee substituted language, which, as Wright and Gold
correctly point out, is "nearly incomprehensible." WRIGHT& GOLD, supra note 104, § 6111, at 23.
The language read as follows: "Specific instances of conduct ... may... be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character
the witness being cross-examined has testified." House Hearings, supra note 106, at 164-65 (First
Committee Print, Rule 608(b)).
.
5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, § 608.22(2)(c)(i) at 608-56. They state that "the
original rule was amended by Congress to ensure that it would be restrictively interpreted by trial
courts," Id. (referring in note 27 to section 608App.01(3) of their treatise, where they explain the
amendment in detail).
156Cases had consistently applied this rule for at least 135 years. See, e.g., United States v.
Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 1959) (stating that impeachment by prior bad acts is "within
the sound discretion of the trial court"); Touhy v. United States, 88 F.2d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1937)
(same); State v. Schutte, 117 A. 508, 512 (Conn. 1922) ("If acts of misconduct which indicate a lack
of veracity are inquired into on cross-examination, it is within the discretion of the trial court
whether or not to permit such examination."); State v. Killion, 148 P. 643,645 (Kan. 1915) ("[H]ow
far the inquiry [into bad acts] may go is largely a matter of discretion with the trial court.");
Territory v. Chavez, 45 P. 1107, 1108 (N.M. 1896) ("The extent to which cross-examination will
be permitted is no doubt, in a large measure, in the discretion of the trial court."); Third Great W.
Tpk. Co. v. Loomis, 32 N.Y. 127, 132 (1865) ("It has heretofore been understood that the range of
irrelevant inquiry for the purpose of degrading a witness was subject to the control of the presiding
judge.").
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of"in the discretion of the court" was meant merely to reiterate existing law, not
to make a significant change in the law.'57 Finally, the Subcommittee Note to Rule
608(b) reveals that the new language was added primarily to compensate for
deletion of the phrase "and not remote in time." The Note read:
The Subcommittee redrafted the second sentence to emphasize the
discretionary role of the court in permitting such testimony and deleted
the reference to remoteness in time as being unnecessary and confusing
(remoteness from time of trial or remoteness from the incident
involved?). The Subcommittee is of the view that explicitly referring to
the discretion of the court and deleting the reference to remoteness is a
more practical way to deal with the subject. 158
This language suggests that by adding "in the discretion of the court" Congress
was not issuing a general direction to courts to interpret Rule 608(b)
restrictively. '59
Although the Justice Department filed new objections with the Subcommittee
to the self-incrimination provision added in the Revised Draft, neither the
Subcommittee nor the full Judiciary Committee changed that provision. 16 No
further changes were made to Rule 608(b) in either the House or the Senate.
Like Rule 609(a), the final version of 608(b) is virtually without standards
and leaves the impeachment decision entirely to the discretion of trial judges.
Because the rule does not specify what sort of misconduct is probative of
truthfulness, 161 federal judges could in good faith continue to follow whatever
approach to impeachment by bad acts they had followed before Rule 608(b) was
'Because the new language was placed just before the clause "if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness," House Hearings, supra note 106, at 164-65 (First Committee Print, Rule 608(b)),
the Subcommittee may have intended to indicate that a trial judge should have discretion to
determine what conduct was probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.
1581d
"
"'The Report of the full Judiciary Committee deleted the second sentence quoted above
without any explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 10 (1973). Perhaps the full Committee did
not want to appear to limit the exercise of discretion to the remoteness issue only. Even if this is
true, however, there is no reason to conclude from either the language of the rule or the first
sentence in the Judiciary Committee Report quoted above that the Committee or Congress intended
the rule to be restrictively interpreted.
'6°House Hearings, supra note 106, at 342, 348 (letter from Acting Deputy Attorney General
William D. Ruckelshaus).
1'6 David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1155, 1166
(1992) (noting that "there is some question about the precise rule invoked by the drafters of the
Federal Rules of Evidence" regarding which acts of misconduct bear on a witness's "character for
truthfulness rather than general bad moral character").
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enacted. 6 ' A judge who followed the New York approach that any act placing
"the advancement of... individual self-interest ahead of principle or the interests
of society" is probative of truthfulness1 63 could obviously allow questioning about
a nearly limitless range of misconduct. On the other hand, a judge who believed
that virtually no impeachment by bad acts should be allowed could ban almost all
such impeachment by limiting questions to acts directly involving false statement
or deceit and by routinely invoking the protections of Rules 403 and 611.
D. Practice Under the Rules
Given the longstanding, widespread disagreements as to witness
impeachment, it was inevitable the elastic standards of Rules 609(a) and 608(b)
would lead to inconsistent decisions about whether particular crimes or
misconduct could be used to impeach. Some federal courts allow impeachment
with a broad range of crimes and misconduct while others are much more
restrictive. '64
In applying Rule 609(a)(1), federal courts disagree about the admissibility
of convictions for drug dealing, 165 petit larceny, 166 burglary,'6 7 assault,'68
162Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick have expressed frustration at the ambiguity of Rule
608(b). See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE: DOCTRINE
AND PRACTICE § 6.40, at 819 (1995). They identify three views of what conduct bears on
truthfulness-a broad view, a focused view, and a middle view. Id. Under the broad view, virtually
any conduct indicating bad character bears on truthfulness. Id. Under the focused view, behavior
bears on truthfulness "only if it actually involves falsehood or deception." Id. Under the middle
view, conduct taking advantage of others in violation of their rights would qualify, but "personal"
forms of wrongdoing, such as taking drugs, would not. Id. Although Professors Mueller and
Kirkpatrick would like Rule 608(b) to be interpreted to embrace the focused view and to reject the
broad view, they admit that "this reading seems uncertain because everyone agrees that truthfulness
is the issue, and the question is whether conduct embraced by the middle and broader views bears
on truthfulness." Id. at 820. They read the Advisory Committee's Note as rejecting the broad view,
but, unfortunately, as having "nothing to say about the middle view." Id.
163People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377 (1974).
164State courts also continue to vary greatly in applying impeachment standards. Judges in
states adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence must deal with the same vague and ambiguous
language as federal judges. Moreover, when adopting the Federal Rules, many states chose to
modify the impeachment provisions. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6131, at 175. As a result,
"[m]ost state versions of Rule 609 differ significantly from the federal rule." Id. Rule 608, by
contrast, was more often adopted verbatim, although some jurisdictions made substantive changes.
Id. § 6111 at 27-28. For a detailed discussion of the state standards, see id. § 6111, at 27-30; id. §
6131, at 175-89.
165Compare United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460,465-66 (9th Cir. 1978) (allowing
prosecutor in drug prosecution to cross-examine defendant about prior drug dealing conviction),
United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing impeachment with convictions
for smuggling cocaine), and United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that
prior convictions for selling heroin show "a narcotics trafficker lives a life of secrecy and
dissembling in the course of that activity, being prepared to say whatever is required by the
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robbery, 169 weapons violations," 7 murder,"' and arson.172 Some courts allow an
demands of the moment, whether the truth or a lie"), with United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464,
1473 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding admission of prior conviction for trafficking in heroin improper), and
United States v. Williams, 587 F.2d 1, 1-2 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding in counterfeiting prosecution
that defendant's prior conviction for selling marijuana should not be admitted).
"6Compare United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that "petit
larceny [has] a definite bearing on honesty which is related to credibility"), and United States v.
Carr, 418 F.2d 1184, 1185-86 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that petit larceny conviction shows poor
character and dishonesty), with United States v. Musliu, 872 F.2d 431,436 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
in cocaine prosecution that prior convictions for petit larceny were inadmissible), and United States
v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that petit larceny has no bearing on the
"accused's propensity to testify truthfully," and thus a prior conviction for that crime may not be
admitted).
167Compare United States v. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411, 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (allowing cross-
examination of defendant about burglary conviction in drug prosecution), Lewis v. Sheriff's Dep't,
817 F.2d 465, 466 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing defendant in civil action by prisoner for beating by
guards, to cross-examine plaintiff about his convictions for burglary), United States v. Portillo, 633
F.2d 1313, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1980) (admitting burglary conviction), United States v. Brown, 603
F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating that burglary has "a definite bearing on honesty, which is
directly related to credibility"), andUnited States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 191 (10th Cir. 1978)
(allowing defendant charged with burglary to be cross-examined about burglary conviction), with
United States v. Begay, 144 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding burglary conviction
inadmissible to impeach in prosecution for robbery), and United States v. Rodriguez-Andrade, 62
F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding burglary conviction inadmissible to impeach witness).
16 8Compare United States v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1994) (admitting conviction
for aggravated battery in trial for possession of firearm), United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 426
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding assault conviction admissible), and United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp.
50, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (allowing cross-examination about conviction for aggravated assault in
kidnapping case), with United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
impeachment with convictions for assault and possession of contraband in prosecution for assault
with dangerous weapon), United States v. Grove, 844 F. Supp. 1495, 1496-98 (D. Utah 1994)
(excluding conviction for aggravated assault in drug and firearm prosecution), and Lewis v. Velez,
149 F.R.D. 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding in civil rights action against prison guards that
plaintiffs assault conviction was inadmissible to impeach his credibility).
169Compare United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing
impeachment with robbery convictions), and United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 235 (6th Cir.
1990) (allowing prior conviction on robbery charge for impeachment), with United States v. Bagley,
772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that bank robbery conviction in prosecution for bank
robbery probably should have been excluded).
170Compare United States v. Tracey, 36 F.3d 187,191-94 (1 st Cir. 1994) (allowing defendant
charged with firearm possession to be impeached with convictions for illegal weapons possession),
United States v. Rattigan, 996 F.2d 1218, 1223 (6th Cir. 1993) (allowing evidence concerning
defendant's felony gun possession convictions in prosecution for firearms violations), and United
States v. Booker, 706 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing defendant charged with violation of
federal firearms statutes to be impeached with three convictions for similar crimes), with United
States v. Cameron, 814 F.2d 403, 405-06 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding exclusion of conviction for
carrying switchblade knife).
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accused to be impeached with convictions that are identical or very similar to the
crime charged, despite the obvious prejudice, 73 while other courts exclude such
convictions. 7 4 Some of the inconsistency in applying Rule 609(a)(1) may be
explained by the specific circumstances of individual cases or by the different
standard of admissibility for an accused. 75 Nonetheless, the inconsistency in
decisions is striking.
The federal courts also are inconsistent in applying Rule 609(a)(2), which
mandates automatic admission of any crime, felony or misdemeanor, involving
"dishonesty or false statement."'' 76 Although courts generally admit convictions
'
71Compare Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing civil
rights plaintiff in action charging torture to extract confession to be impeached with murder
convictions), with Eng v. Scully, 146 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (excluding evidence of
plaintiff's murder conviction in action against correction officials).
'71Compare United States v. Walker, 817 F.2d 461, 463-64 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding
admission of arson conviction), with United States v. Nachamie, 101 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145-46
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (excluding evidence of attempted arson conviction).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing defendant
charged with robbery to be impeached with convictions of robberies); United States v. Moore, 917
F.2d 215, 235 (6th Cir. 1990) (same), United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1987)
(same), United States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1985) (same), see also United States
v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1988) (allowing narcotic-related convictions to be used to
impeach defendant facing narcotics charges); United States v. Thompson, 806 F.2d 1332, 1339 (7th
Cir. 1986) (allowing defendant charged with tax evasion to be impeached with conviction for tax
evasion); United States v. Levine, 700 F.2d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing defendant charged
with theft from the mails to be impeached with a similar conviction), United States v. Fountain, 642
F.2d 1083, 1091-92 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing defendant on trial for murder to be impeached with
murder conviction).
74See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295,298-99 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding it proper
to exclude similar conviction in case charging assault with knife); United States v. Wallace, 848
F.2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding it prejudicial to admit conviction for heroin trafficking in
prosecution for possession of heroin with intent to distribute); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d
482,488 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that although error was harmless, district court may have abused
discretion in allowing impeachment with robbery convictions in prosecution for bank robbery);
United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant's conviction for
assault with intent to commit armed robbery was properly excluded in bank robbery prosecution
as too similar).
'On the other hand, as the cases cited supra notes 165-74 demonstrate, many federal courts
show no particular solicitude for criminal defendants.
176See Gainor, supra note 97, at 777 ("[The determination of which crimes involve dishonesty
or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2) has been the subject of considerable judicial
disagreement."). Courts are virtually unanimous on one point: If a prior conviction is held to involve
dishonesty or false statement, any witness, including a criminal defendant, may be asked about it,
and the party opposing impeachment may not seek recourse to Rule 403 to bar impeachment. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222,228 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding impeachment automatic);
Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 577, 578-82 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding impeachment automatic and not
performing 403 balancing); United States v. Kuecker, 740 F.2d 496, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Leyva, 659 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1981) (same). The Supreme Court appeared to
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that directly involve lying or deceit, such as perjury,' 77 forgery,'78 and various
kinds of fraud,'79 and exclude convictions for assault, 8° traffic violations, 8'
weapons offenses,' 82 drunkenness, 83 and sex offenses, 184 they disagree about
many other convictions that fall in the middle range, such as robbery,'85 drug
offenses, 86 larceny,"' and burglary88 Sometimes convictions that would not
approve this position in Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504,526(1989) (noting that "it is widely
agreed" that Rule 609 "bars exercise of judicial discretion pursuant to Rule 403" for crimenfalsi
convictions under (a)(2)).
'77See, e.g., United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that crime of
making sworn false statement to government official is "obviously" crime of dishonesty and false
statement); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1472 n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that
admissibility of prior perjury conviction was not raised by defendant on appeal).
17 8See, e.g., Wagner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 890 F.2d 652, 655 n.3, 656 (3d Cir.
1989) (allowing prior convictions to impeach plaintiff in civil suit); United States v. Jackson, 696
F.2d 578, 589 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing admission of conviction for transporting forged securities).
179See, e.g., United States v. McClintock, 748 F.2d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (mail fraud);
United States v. Wong, 703 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1983) (Medicare fraud); United States v. Whitman,
665 F.2d 313, 319-20 (10th Cir. 1981) (land fraud).
'
8 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 588 F.2d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir. 1978) ("An assault
conviction does not involve dishonesty or false statements"); Carlsen v. Javurek, 526 F.2d 202, 210
(8th Cir. 1975) (holding misdemeanors not relating to veracity not admissible).
'See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1513-14 (8th Cir. 1992) (outstanding
traffic tickets); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1252 (4th Cir. 1976) (drunk driving).
182See, e.g., United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1254 (7th Cir. 1993) (unlawful use of
weapon); United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (carrying pistol without
license).
183See, e.g., Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding public
intoxication convictions "obviously inadmissible"); United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1252
(4th Cir. 1976) (public drunkenness).
'
84See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 613 F.2d 1349, 1354 (5th Cir. 1980) (prostitution);
United States v. Cox, 536 F.2d 65, 71 (5th Cir. 1976) (same).
11
5 Compare United States v. Begay, 144 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
there was no automatic admission for robbery conviction), and United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d
348,362 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that attempted robbery was not within (a)(2)), with United States
v. Kinslow, 860 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that armed robbery involves "dishonesty"),
and United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that attempted robbery
conviction was admissible under (a)(2)).
1
86Compare Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 595 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that conviction for
smuggling drugs into penitentiary was not admissible under (a)(2)), United States v. Mehrmanesh,
689 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that conviction for smuggling hashish should not be
given (a)(2) admission), and United States v. Thompson, 559 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1977)
(denying automatic admission to misdemeanor conviction for marijuana possession), with United
States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that narcotics conviction would be
admissible under (a)(2) if trafficker engaged in secrecy or dissembling).
'Compare Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Toqto, 529 F.2d 278, 281-82 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating
that petit larceny does not involve dishonesty or false statement), United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d
922, 935-36 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that shoplifting is not a crime of dishonesty under (a) (2)),
and United States v. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1978) (same), with McHenry v.
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ordinarily fall under Rule 609(a)(2) are placed there if the crime involved
elements of deceit or secrecy. 189
Courts are similarly inconsistent in applying Rule 608(b). Commentators
point out that courts take three different approaches. 9 Courts taking the broad
approach believe that "virtually any conduct indicating bad character also
indicates untruthfulness."' 9 Under the narrow approach, misconduct bears on
truthfulness only if it directly involves lying or deception.1 92 Finally, under the
middle approach, "'behavior seeking personal advantage by taking from others
in violation of their rights"' is seen as bearing on truthfulness. 193 These different
positions have led courts to inconsistent rulings on the admissibility of such
Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184, 188-89 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding shoplifting involves dishonesty), United
States v. Del Toro Soto, 676 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding grand larceny conviction certainly
admissible under (a) (2)), and United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding
petit larceny to be crime involving dishonesty).
88 Compare United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding conviction
for burglary, absent fraud or deceit, not admissible under (a)(2)), with United States v. Brown, 603
F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that burglary conviction has "definite bearing on honesty
which is directly related to credibility").
189See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that narcotics
conviction may be admissible under (a)(2) if trafficker engaged in secrecy and dissembling); United
States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that robbery may be crime of
dishonesty within (a)(2) if it is committed by fraudulent or deceitful means); United States v. Mejia-
Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that "trial court may look beyond the
elements of an offense that is not considered a per se crime of dishonesty to determine whether the
particular conviction rested upon facts establishing dishonesty or false statement"). Wright and Gold
criticize this practice on the ground that convictions for just about any crime might be admitted
under this approach. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6135, at 252. This plainly seems true
of drug offenses. Because drugs are illegal, smuggling, sale, and use of drugs are done in secret.
Virtually all drug crimes involve hiding and deception and thus might reasonably be classed under
Rule 609(a)(2).
'
90See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, § 608.22[2][c], at 608-57 to -58; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.40, at 819; see also United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770,
774-75 (7th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging commentators' view of three approaches).
"'MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.40, at 819; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 136, § 608.22[2][c], at 608-57 ("[U]nder a broad view, virtually any conduct indicating
bad character relates to untruthfulness.").
192MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.40, at 819; WE1NSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 136, § 608.22[2][c], at 608-57.
1 9 3WEFNSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, § 608.22[2][c], at 608-57 (quoting Manske, 186
F.3d at 774-75).
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misconduct as theft, 194 drug use, 195 prostitution, 9 6 bribery,' 97 fraud, 9s and the use
of excessive force. 99
'Compare United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1355 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing cross-
examination about defendant's receipt of stolen tires), United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 1188, 1193
(7th Cir. 1996) (allowing witness to be cross-examined about prior thefts because "acts of theft..
. are, like acts of fraud or deceit, probative of a witness's truthfulness or untruthfulness"), and
Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1566-67 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding
that plaintiff could be questioned about buying stolen railroad tickets because stealing (and
receiving and using stolen property) are generally seen as acts that reflect negatively on credibility),
with United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1004-07 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (upholding district court's
refusal to allow defendant to cross-examine law enforcement agent about charges that he had stolen
drugs); United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1567 (1Ith Cir. 1991) (holding that district court
correctly prohibited defendant from being questioned about pending charges for theft), and Wanke
v. Lynn's Transp. Co., 836 F. Supp. 587, 597 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding possession of stolen
property inadmissible unless it involved intent to deceive).
"'Compare United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding
questioning about witness's drug use), andUnited States v. Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1102 (1 1th
Cir. 1994) (stating that questions about witness's personal use of marijuana may have been proper
on cross-examination), with United States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding
error in cross-examination of defendant about his drug use), Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438,
1446 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that witness's "use of drugs may not be used to attack his or her
general credibility"), Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
inadmissible defendant's use of alcohol and illicit drugs), andUnited States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837,
841-42 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that instances of drug use are not probative of truthfulness for
purposes of Rule 608(b)).
96Compare United States v. Burch, 490 F.2d 1300, 1301-04 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that
Rule 608(b) did not preclude asking woman about solicitation for prostitution and then robbing
victim because deception bore on credibility), with United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785,789 (8th
Cir. 1983) (refusing to allow questions about engaging in prostitution).
197Compare United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799,803-05 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding evidence
of defendant's bribery probative of character for truthfulness and thus admissible to impeach), and
United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1500-01 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding details underlying prior
bribery conviction admissible under Rule 608(b)), with United v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 24 (1st
Cir. 2001) (holding that district court should not have permitted government to cross-examine
defendant about his violation of company's gratuity policy), and United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d
149, 156 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding evidence of bribery inadmissible).
'
98Compare United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir. 1989) (allowing cross-
examination about insurance fraud), and United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 257, 261 (10th Cir.
1985) (allowing cross-examination about ballot fraud), with United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814,
827 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding refusal to allow defendant to cross-examine government witness
about his illegal engagement in structured transactions to avoid current transaction reporting
requirements), United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1083 (2d Cir. 1981) (refusing to allow
evidence of fraudulent loan application to impeach witness), and Romero v. Boyd Bros. Transp.
Co., 1994 WL 287434, at 3 (W.D. Va. June 14, 1994) (holding that district court did not abuse
discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination about defendant's fraudulent documents stating
he was citizen when he really was illegal alien).
'"
99Compare United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 671-74 (1st Cir. 1978) (upholding
cross-examination of fellow officers called as defense witnesses in police brutality prosecution as
to whether they had been suspended for use of excessive force), with United States v. Lawes, 292
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Additional conflicts and inconsistencies between Rules 609(a) and 608(b)
exacerbated problems in applying them. Following the approach of the Model
Code and Uniform Rules,2°° the drafters and legislators appear to have considered
each rule separately and made little attempt to harmonize their provisions. Rules
609(a) and 608(b), as enacted, were inconsistent in important ways, despite the
substantial overlap in impeachment by convictions and bad acts. The
inconsistencies were not addressed in 1990 when Rule 609(a) was amended.
Unfortunately, no corresponding changes were made in Rule 608(b).
As originally enacted, Rule 609(a) stated that for the purpose of impeaching
the credibility of a witness, evidence the witness had been convicted of a crime
"shall be admitted . . . but only if the crime (1) [was a felony] and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment. ' 2'° Rule 608(b) read: "Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'
credibility... may ... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness .... 202 These
provisions are inconsistent in at least two important ways. First, Rule 609(a)(1)
grants special protection to defendants while Rule 608(b) does not. Under
609(a)(1), a party seeking to use a prior felony conviction to impeach a defendant
(or, perhaps, a witness associated with a defendant) has the burden to demonstrate
"that the probative value of this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant. 2 3 Under Rule 608(b), by contrast, all witnesses, including defendants,
may be impeached with specific instances of conduct if the conduct is probative
of untruthfulness, and the burden is clearly on the party opposing impeachment
to block it under Rules 403 or 611. Second, by using the phrase "shall be
admitted, '' 2' Rule 609(a) appears to call for automatic admission of felony
convictions of witnesses other than defendants (and, perhaps, witnesses associated
with defendants) as well as felony or misdemeanor convictions of any witness,
including a defendant, if the conviction involved dishonesty or false statement.
Under Rule 608(b), by contrast, impeachment is always "in the discretion of the
F.3d 123, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding decision precluding cross-examination of arresting
police officer about his citation by Civilian Complaint Review Board for use of excessive force
against arrestee in unrelated case).20 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.20IFED. R. EVID. 609(a) (1975).
2021d. 608(b).
2031d. 609(a).
2
O41d
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court. '205 Why Rules 609(a) and 608(b) are inconsistent in these ways is not
explained in either the Advisory Committee's Notes or the legislative history.
Another important inconsistency between the two rules concerns time limits.
Rule 609(b) generally forbids impeachment under 609(a)(1) "if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date., 20 6 Older convictions can be admitted only if "the court determines, in the
interests ofjustice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific
facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect., 207 Rule
608(b), by contrast, imposes no time limit on bad acts. As noted above, Congress
was not unconcerned with the time problem. The phrase "in the discretion of the
court" was added to Rule 608(b) in part as a substitute for deleted language
requiring that bad acts be "not remote in time. 20 8 Without a specific deadline,
however, courts obviously can allow impeachment with bad acts occurring more
than ten years in the past.20 9
Other troubling ambiguities in Rule 609(a)(1) split the circuits until finally
resolved by the United States Supreme Court in 1989 in Green v. Bock
Laundry.2" ° One question concerned whether the reference to "the defendant" in
Rule 609(a)(1) included only criminal defendants or also encompassed defendants
in civil cases.2 1' Another question was whether the phrase "shall be admitted"
required mandatory admission under Rule 609(a)(1) of convictions to impeach
witnesses other than the defendant (or, perhaps, witnesses associated with the
defendant), thus precluding resort to Rule 403 balancing for other witnesses.212 As
to the first question, the Court held that Rule 609(a)(1) gave special protection
2051d. 608(b). Moreover, the legislative history of Rule 608(b) makes clear that impeachment
may be blocked under Rules 403 and 611. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
2
°6FED R. EVID. 609(b).
2071d.
208See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.2
°gRules 609 and 608(b) also are inconsistent as to the admissibility ofjuvenile adjudications.
Under Rule 609, evidence ofjuvenile adjudications is not admissible, except that in criminal cases
a court may allow a witness other than an accused to be impeached with a juvenile offense if the
court determines that admission of the evidence "is necessary for a fair determination of the issue
of guilt or innocence." FED. R. EvID. 609(d). Rule 608(b) does not contain such a provision. The
effect of this inconsistency may be lessened somewhat by the language of Rule 608(b) making
admission of prior misconduct discretionary because courts can be expected to exclude misconduct
that occurred when a witness was young. Nonetheless, Rule 609(d) contains a specific limitation
not present in Rule 608(b).
One final inconsistency between the rules is supported by history. Under Rule 609(a), prior
convictions may be proven by extrinsic evidence. id. 608(a). Under Rule 608(b), however, extrinsic
evidence is not allowed. Id. 608(b).
210490 U.S. 504 (1989).
2
"
1Id. at 508-0922Id. at 524.
No. 2] 669
670 UTAH LAW REVIEW [2003:635
only to defendants in criminal cases.2 13 To have held otherwise would have led to
the absurd conclusion that defendants in civil cases had greater protections than
plaintiffs from impeachment by prior convictions.24 As to the second question,
the court held the mandatory language required judges in civil cases to allow
impeachment of any witness with evidence of prior felony convictions,
"regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party offering the
testimony., 21 5 Other language in the opinion strongly suggested the same standard
would apply to prosecution witnesses in criminal cases.21 6
In 1990, the Advisory Committee and Congress responded to Green by
amending Rule 609(a).21 7 Section (a)(1) as amended retains the special protection
for criminal defendants but specifically abrogates the Green holding automatically
admitting felony convictions to impeach witnesses other than an accused. Under
the amended rule, a party opposing impeachment of any witness other than an
accused may now seek to block impeachment under Rule 403. Thus, a prosecutor
or any party in a civil proceeding may argue that impeachment should not be
allowed because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value of impeachment. In addition, the stark separation of
witnesses-the accused versus any other witness-means that defense counsel
may no longer seek the special protection previously available to witnesses
2131d. at 521.
2141d. at 508-11. The Court strongly implied that to differentiate between civil litigants in this
way would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 510. The Court explicitly
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's observation that in civil cases, Rule 609(a)(1) "'can't mean what
it says."' Id. at 511 (quoting Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)).
2
.ld. at 527.
2
'The Court noted that the Conference Committee, which wrote the version of Rule 609(a)(1)
finally enacted by Congress, meant the rule to "shield the accused but not the prosecution." Id. at
520. The Court also concluded that the conferees "intended that only the accused in a criminal case
should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1)." Id. at 523-24.
Finally, the Court's reasoning in forbidding resort to Rule 403 to bar impeachment of witnesses in
civil cases applies equally to impeachment of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. The Court
points out that as a matter of construction, the phrase "shall be admitted" applies to both (a)(2) and
(a)(l), subject only to the exception in (a)(1) for defendants in criminal cases. Id. at 525-26. If the
mandatory language applies to subpart (a)(1), and only criminal defendants are excepted, it follows
that prosecution witnesses should not be.
2 1
'The amendment is as follows:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence
that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted,
subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to
the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence-Rule 609, 129 F.R.D. 347, 352 (1990).
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associated with the accused. 21 8 Finally, section (a)(2) was amended to clarify that
any witness, including an accused, may be impeached with a prior conviction
involving honesty or false statement without any Rule 403 balancing.219
No corresponding amendments were made to Rule 608(b) in 1990.
Nonetheless, the amendments to Rule 609(a) reduce the inconsistency between
Rules 609(a) and 608(b) in one significant way. After Green and before the
amendments, felony convictions automatically could be used under Rule
609(a)(1) to impeach any witness other than an accused (or a witness associated
with an accused), although Rule 403 was available to block impeachment by
similar misconduct under Rule 608(b). After the amendment, Rule 403 can be
invoked to block impeachment with a prior felony conviction of witnesses other
than the accused under Rule 609(a)(1) as well as to block impeachment under
Rule 608(b) with similar misconduct not resulting in a conviction. The other
major inconsistencies-special treatment for an accused under Rule 609(a)(1) but
not Rule 608(b), and automatic admission of all crimes involving dishonesty or
false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) but not under Rule 608(b)-remain.
In addition to the textual differences between Rules 609(a) and 608(b), there
also appears to be some inconsistency in the application of the two rules.
Although I cannot verify this assertion empirically, it is my impression from
reading hundreds of cases that many courts tend to be more liberal in allowing
impeachment under Rule 609(a)(1) than under Rule 608(b).22 ° Many courts are
more likely to allow impeachment with a bad act if the misconduct resulted in a
conviction than if it did not. This inconsistency is most noticeable with
2Id. at 353. The amendment to Rule 609(a)(1) also eliminated the requirement that the prior
conviction be elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination,
thus approving the common practice of revealing the conviction on direct examination of a witness
to remove its "sting" and allowing proof of the prior conviction with any appropriate extrinsic
evidence, not only a "public record." See id.
2191d. at 352.
22
°Perhaps courts are responding to the many scholars who have opined that Rule 608(b)
should be restrictively interpreted. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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misconduct considered to have only a small or medium bearing on credibility,
such as robbery,22' drug use,222 theft, 223 and assault.224
Courts also are inconsistent as to the amount of detail about misconduct they
admit under Rules 609(a) and 608(b). Many courts restrict inquiry under Rule
609(a) to the name of the crime, the date of conviction, and the sentence. 5 With
bad acts, by contrast, courts often must allow a broader inquiry into the factual
details. Without a conviction, there is not always a convenient label to
characterize the wrongdoing. Thus, under Rule 609(a) a court might limit a cross-
examiner to asking, "Isn't it true that you were convicted of robbery in June of
1995 and sentenced to six years in jail?" but under Rule 608(b) allow a cross-
examiner to ask, "Isn't it true that in June of 1995, at the comer of Broadway and
53rd street, you stopped Ms. X at gunpoint and demanded that she give you all of
her money, and when she hesitated, you tore her purse from her hands and ran?"
The result is that bad act impeachment sometimes may be more prejudicial than
impeachment with a conviction even though the underlying acts are the same.226
22 Compare United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing
impeachment under Rule 609(a)(1) with prior robbery conviction), and United States v. Moore, 917
F.2d 215, 235 (6th Cir. 1990) (same), with United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38, 40-41 (8th Cir.
1978) (upholding district court decision to exclude evidence, under Rule 608(b), of witness's
involvement in bank robberies).2
11Compare United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1997) (allowing
impeachment under Rule 609(a)(1) for prior narcotics-related conviction), and United States v.
George, 752 F.2d 749, 756 (1st Cir. 1985) (same), with United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 602
(11 th Cir. 1990) (approving exclusion of prior drug use to impeach under Rule 608(b)), and United
States v. McDonald, 905 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
223Compare United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir. 1979) (allowing
impeachment under 609(a)(1) with convictions for burglary and petit larceny), with Sellers, 906
F.2d at 603 (holding prior unrelated theft not admissible under Rule 608(b)).224Compare United States v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 1994) (admitting prior
conviction for aggravated assault in trial for possession of firearm), with United States v. Parker,
133 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that violent crimes are not relevant to witness's character
for truthfulness under Rule 608(b)).225See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 409-10 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that
criminal defendant may be questioned only about whether he was previously convicted of felony,
its name, and when conviction was obtained); United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222,228 (6th Cir.
1992) (permitting examination only as to fact of prior conviction and prohibiting further probing
by prosecutor); United States v. Breckenridge, 782 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
trial court properly limited questions about facts underlying conviction). But see United States v.
Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1501 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that statutory name of crime may give
insufficient information and that some details of offense should be brought out).226Courts also may allow broader inquiry into underlying details under Rule 608(b) because
of the rule forbidding a cross-examiner to prove the misconduct with extrinsic evidence. If the
questioner was limited to asking, "Isn't it true you robbed someone?" and the witness answered,
"No," the witness might be seen to have an unfair advantage over the questioner. Follow-up
questions about the underlying details allow the cross-examiner to suggest that the misconduct
actually occurred.
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In sum, the history of impeachment by convictions and bad acts is marked
by extraordinary inconsistency. Judges, rulemakers, and legislators have been
unable to agree on what the standards should be or how they should be applied.
This inconsistency has high costs. These costs are explained in the next section.
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III. THE PROBLEMS WITH CACOPHONY
The language of Rules 609(a) and 608(b) has proven to be extremely elastic.
Indeed, it is difficult to think of another area of the law where disagreement about
the appropriate standards and their application is so wide-spread. The inconsistent
application of each rule and the inconsistencies between the rules create
substantial problems in the administration of justice.
Ideally, federal law should be uniform because it is one government's law.
State evidentiary rules may vary from the federal rules and from each other, but
the federal rules should mean the same thing in Idaho and in Alabama, and from
one federal courtroom to the next. 7 Local differences may justify different
results in particular cases, but, to the extent possible, the basic meaning of the
Federal Rules of Evidence should be the same nationwide.
Several important policies are compromised by inconsistent interpretation of
federal evidence rules. First, litigants are denied equal protection of the laws.
Treating like cases alike is basic to the American notion of fairness.228 When one
judge decides that a particular conviction or bad act may be used to impeach a
witness, and another judge decides exactly the opposite, the law is not protecting
the witnesses and the litigants equally. Second, when the law is unpredictable,
people cannot plan their affairs or rely on the law with confidence. 29 For
litigation to proceed rationally, the parties must identify potential witnesses
relatively early in a lawsuit and determine how their testimony will fit into the
plaintiffs or the defendant's theory of the case. Revelation of a conviction or a
bad act can devastate a witness's credibility. Not only may the jurors conclude the
witness has a bad character for truthfulness, they may conclude the witness has
a bad character, period. The "bad person" inference is particularly damaging when
227The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of the uniform interpretation of
federal law. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) ("[P]etitioners' concern with the
need for uniformity and consistency of federal criminal law is well taken .... "); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (stating that use of diverse state laws governing
federal commercial paper "would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional
uncertainty... [and] lead to great diversity in results... [thus making the] desirability of a uniform
[federal] rule . .. plain"); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 350 (1855) (noting that
country "would be incomplete and altogether insufficient for the great ends contemplated, unless
a constitutional arbiter was provided to give certainty and uniformity, in all of the States, to the
interpretation of the constitution and the legislation of congress"); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (stressing "the importance, and even necessity of uniformity
of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the
constitution").2 28Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817, 852 (1994).229See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597 (1987) (arguing that "[t]he
ability to predict what a decisionmaker will do helps us plan our lives, have some degree of repose,
and avoid the paralysis of foreseeing only the unknown").
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the witness is a party because the jury may decide the case on that basis, rather
than on the evidence presented.230 Case preparation may be paralyzed if counsel
is unable to make any prediction about whether impeachment will be allowed. If
the witness subject to impeachment is a party or is otherwise central to the case,
counsel literally may not know whether to proceed, abandon the suit, or settle.
Counsel for a criminal defendant often will not know if the defendant can testify.
Counsel thus must muddle through, trying to plan alternate strategies.
The problems of planning and prejudice may be lessened if the judge
assigned to the case has an impeachment track record. If the judge generally
allows wide-open impeachment or limits it sharply, some of the uncertainty can
be avoided. In addition, parties can seek a pretrial ruling on impeachment
questions. 231 But the problems may remain. The vague, ambiguous language of
Rules 609(a) and 608(b) make decisions necessarily subjective and ad hoc. Thus,
ajudge may be inconsistent from one ruling to another. A judge also may decline
to make a final determination on impeachment until after a witness testifies
because properly weighing probity and prejudice may require hearing the
witness's testimony.232 Finally, pretrial rulings generally are made on the eve of
trial, and counsel still will be hampered by not being able to make a prediction
about impeachment in the earlier stages of the case.
A third problem is that Rules 609(a) and 608(b) allow judges virtually
unbridled discretion.233 One purpose of an evidence code is to define standards of
admissibility in specific, recurring situations and thus to limit judicial discretion.
At several points during the codification process the drafters and Congress
intentionally cabined courts rather than giving them free rein.23' Language
23 Justice Souter has noted that unfair prejudice can result from "generalizing a defendant's
earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now
charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent
momentarily)." Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-81 (1997).
2 31Courts clearly have the discretion to decide whether impeachment will be allowed before
the trial starts. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6141, at 291. Weinstein and Berger state that
this is preferable practice with both convictions and bad acts. WE1NSTE1N & BERGER, supra note
136, § 609.22, at 609-62 to -63. The Supreme Court raised the stakes for criminal defendants by
requiring that an accused testify in order to preserve the impeachment issue for appeal. Luce v.
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1984).232See United States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that district
court has "discretion to refuse to rule in advance of trial on the admissibility of impeachment
evidence"); United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977) (encouraging but not
requiring pretrial rulings).
233See Gold, supra note 97, at 2296 (stating that judges "[t]oo often.., make the mistake of
assuming that the uncertainties of the Rule's text provide license to exercise virtually unrestricted
discretion").
2
"For example, the Advisory Committee rejected the suggestion that the system of class
exceptions to the hearsay rule be abandoned in favor of assessing admissibility of hearsay on a case-
by-case basis with procedural safeguards. Preliminary Draft, supra note 99, at 327. According to
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limiting discretion is conspicuously absent from Rules 609(a) and 608(b).
Inconsistent and unpredictable decisions result.
The inconsistencies between the two rules create further problems. Often, the
same criminal misconduct is admissible under one rule but not the other or vice
versa. This makes little sense. As Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick point out,
the two rules proceed on "a single theory of impeachment," namely, that "prior
behavior bears on disposition toward truthfulness."235 In one instance the criminal
behavior resulted in a conviction; in the other it did not. In both instances,
however, "it is the acts themselves that reflect on veracity," not whether a
conviction occurred.236
This "back-door" admission occurs in several different ways. The first
instance arises from the different standards for impeaching a criminal defendant
under 609(a)(1) and 608(b). An accused may be impeached with a prior felony
conviction only if the prosecutor can demonstrate that the probative value of the
conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.237 An accused may be impeached with
a bad act, however, unless the accused can show that the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.23 s If probity and prejudice
are fairly evenly balanced, a prosecutor may be precluded from mentioning the
conviction but allowed to question the defendant about the acts underlying the
conviction. For example, assume an accused is charged with robbery and has a
nine year-old burglary conviction. A judge might reasonably conclude probity
does not outweigh prejudice and therefore bar impeachment with the burglary
conviction under Rule 609(a)(1). Assume further that the judge thinks the
decision was close. The judge then might allow cross-examination about the
burglary itself under Rule 608(b) because the accused cannot show that the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.
the suggestion, admissibility would be determined by weighing probity and prejudice, considering
waste of time, and assessing the availability of more satisfactory evidence. Id. The procedural
safeguards would consist of notice that a party intended to use hearsay, giving the judge freedom
to comment on the weight of the evidence and more authority at both the trial and appellate level
to weigh evidence. Id. The Advisory Committee saw this approach as "involving too great a
measure ofjudicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, enhancing the difficulties
of preparation for trial, adding a further element to the already over-complicated congeries of
pretrial procedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases." Id.
Similarly, Congress rejected the version of Rule 611 (b) submitted by the Supreme Court. That
version allowed a witness to be cross-examined on any issue relevant to the case, unless, in the
exercise of discretion, the court limited examination to matters testified about on direct. Both the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees decided to adopt the traditional rule limiting cross-
examination to the scope of the direct. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 12 (1973); S. REP. No. 93-
1277, at 25 (1974).235MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.49, at 856.
236 1d.
237FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).238Id. 608(b).
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Because the misconduct that forms the basis of the impeachment is exactly
the same, it plainly seems unfair to forbid impeachment under Rule 609(a)(1) but
allow the defendant to be questioned about the underlying acts under Rule 608(b).
Nonetheless, many courts allow this gambit.239 Professor Richard Uviller surveyed
federal judges on this point in 1993, and approximately one-third of the
respondents said they sometimes allow this form of back-door impeachment,
apparently on the theory that Rule 608 is independent of Rule 609.240
Similar back-door impeachment can occur if a witness has a misdemeanor
conviction. Under Rule 609(a)(1), only felony convictions can be used to
impeach, but Rule 608(b) has no such limitation. Thus, a court may forbid
questions about the misdemeanor conviction but allow the witness to be cross-
examined about the acts underlying the conviction.
A third instance of back-door impeachment arises from the different time
limits of the two rules. Under Rule 609(b), convictions more than ten years old
are admissible only if the party seeking to impeach can satisfy a heavy burden of
persuasion.14 1 Rule 608(b) does not have a specific time limit. Although Congress
was concerned about impeachment with stale bad acts,242 by failing to include a
specific time limit, it left the way open for courts to allow such impeachment.
Consequently, a court might bar questions about a twelve- or fifteen-year-old
conviction under Rule 609(b) but allow the witness to be asked about the acts
underlying the conviction under Rule 608(b).
In some cases misconduct admissible under Rule 609(a) may be excluded
under Rule 608(b). If a prior conviction involves dishonesty or false statement,
it is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) against any witness, including
a criminal defendant, and no balancing under Rule 403 is allowed.243 Under Rule
608(b), however, the same misconduct might be excluded under Rule 403 if the
party opposing impeachment can demonstrate that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value. 244 For example, assume a criminal
defendant has a prior misdemeanor conviction for petit larceny and the judge
239See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 279-80 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that
district judge would have let in evidence of prior receipt of stolen property under Rule 608(b) even
though evidence was excluded under Rule 609).
24 H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the
Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 821,835 (1993). The other two-thirds of the respondents agreed with
the statement: "I do not think FRE 608 should be used as a back door when the front door of FRE
609 has been shut." Id. at 835.
24 The proponent must convince the court, "in the interests ofjustice, that the probative value
of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect." FED. R. EvID. 609(b).242See supra notes 144, 147-53 and accompanying text.243See the cases cited supra note 176.2
"See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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believes the conviction involved dishonesty.245 The judge must allow questioning
about the conviction under Rule 609(a)(2). On the other hand, if the defendant
had committed the very same petit larceny but had not been convicted of it, the
judge could exercise discretion under Rule 608(b) to preclude impeachment.
All of these instances of backdoor impeachment are plainly unfair. The
misconduct in each instance is exactly the same; the purpose of admitting it is the
same. Why should impeachment be forbidden under one rule and allowed under
the other? If revealing the conduct is thought to be too prejudicial under one rule,
why is it not considered just as prejudicial under the other? There is no ready
explanation for these inconsistencies.
IV. TOWARD HARMONIZATION OF IMPEACHMENT BY
CONVICTIONS AND BAD ACTS
The law of impeachment by convictions and bad acts is in chaos. The
language of Rules 609 and 608(b) allows judges unfettered discretion. Decisions
applying the rules are wildly inconsistent, resulting in a denial of equal protection,
unpredictability, and unfairness. The further inconsistencies between the rules
lead to the unseemly practice of allowing misconduct barred under one rule as
unduly prejudicial to be admitted under the other. This Part makes suggestions for
harmonizing the two methods of impeachment. First, I suggest ways to lessen the
inconsistencies between the rules. Second, I suggest a process for reaching a
genuine compromise as to what kinds of misconduct may properly be used to
impeach credibility under each rule.
A. Toward Harmony Between the Rules
Historically, there was less inconsistency between the two methods of
impeachment than there is today.246 Although complete consistency is neither
possible nor desirable, several specific steps can be taken to achieve more
consistency.
24
1Some judges so hold. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.246See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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1. Read Some of the Protections of Rule 609 into Rule 608
Courts should read three Rule 609 protections into Rule 608(b). First, the
enhanced protection criminal defendants receive under Rule 609(a)(1) should be
extended to impeachment by bad acts.247 Second, courts should apply the felony
limitation of Rule 609(a)(1) to bad acts that are criminal in nature but do not
directly involve dishonesty or false statement. Third, courts should apply the ten
year time limit of Rule 609(b) to Rule 608(b) and also require that a party seeking
to impeach with a bad act more than ten years old satisfy the heavy burden of
Rule 609(b). It would be best if these changes were made by amending Rule
608(b). Courts could reasonably accomplish these changes themselves, however,
because Rule 608(b) makes all prior bad act impeachment "in the discretion of the
court."
2 4 8
(a) Enhancing Protection for an Accused
A criminal defendant can be impeached with a conviction under Rule
609(a)(1) only if the prosecution can satisfy its burden of showing that the
probative value of the conviction outweighs prejudicial effect.249 Under Rule
608(b), by contrast, any witness, including an accused, can be impeached with
bad acts unless the party opposing impeachment can satisfy the Rule 403 burden
of showing that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative
value.25° This difference creates the back-door admissibility practice whereby a
prosecutor may be barred from asking an accused about a conviction but allowed
to ask about the facts underlying the conviction.
The case for reading the Rule 609(a)(1) protection for an accused into Rule
608(b) and ending the offensive back-door practice is straightforward."' In both
instances it is the criminal misconduct that impeaches the defendant's credibility.
What happened or didn't happen in the criminal justice system after the act
occurred is irrelevant to credibility. A conviction simply makes it somewhat more
likely the defendant committed the misconduct; it does not enhance the probity
of the misconduct. In addition, the prejudicial effect is basically the same whether
the accused is asked about the conviction or the act. The jury is not likely to
distinguish between the questions "Isn't it true that you were convicted of robbing
Ms. Jones at knife-point on September 1?" and "Isn't is true that you robbed Ms.
247Professor Ordover suggested something very like this proposal in 1989 before Rule 609(a)
was amended. See Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt andlnnocence: Rules
404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 137-38 (1989).248FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
2491d. 609(a)(1).
25
°See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.25
'Possible counterarguments are addressed infra notes 271-90 and accompanying text.
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Jones at knife-point on September 1?" In both instances the jury probably will
draw the forbidden inference about the defendant's character and may presume
that he acted in conformity with that character in the present case.252 Since the
probative value and the prejudicial effect of the misconduct are precisely the same
with both methods of impeachment, it makes no sense to grant the defendant less
protection under Rule 608(b) than under Rule 609(a)(1).2 53 Thus, courts should
require prosecutors to satisfy the Rule 609(a)(1) burden of showing that probative
value outweighs prejudicial effect when cross-examining an accused about bad
acts.254
(b) Limiting Impeachment with Criminal Bad Acts to Serious Wrongdoing
For similar reasons, courts should limit cross-examination about bad acts that
are criminal in nature but do not directly involve dishonesty or false statement to
misconduct that would constitute a felony if the witness had been convicted.
Under Rule 609(a)(1), impeachment with convictions that do not directly involve
dishonesty or false statement is limited to crimes "punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year. ' 255 Rule 608(b), however, contains no such
limitation. Thus, while a cross-examiner cannot use the front door to ask about a
misdemeanor conviction, the cross-examiner can use the back door to ask about
the acts underlying the conviction. Congress determined only felonies have
sufficient bearing on credibility unless a conviction directly involves dishonesty
or false statement. Again, because it is the misconduct rather than the conviction
that is the relevant datum, it makes no sense to bar questions about the conviction
but allow questions about the underlying acts.
One problem with applying the felony limitation to Rule 608(b) is that it will
not always be clear whether the bad acts were sufficiently serious to constitute a
252FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith .... ").
253As Professor Ordover points out, one purpose of granting the defendant enhanced protection
is to prod him to testify. See Ordover, supra note 247, at 144-45. This goal is undermined if the
prosecutor is allowed to ask about the facts underlying a conviction under Rule 608(b).2
'Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick recognized that "[c]oordinating the mandates of FRE
608 and 609 is surprisingly difficult" and have addressed the back-door problem. See MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.49, at 855. They suggest two approaches to improve
coordination. One would give the cross-examiner a choice of proceeding either under 608(b) or 609
but not both. Id. The other approach would hold that Rule 609 provides the governing standards
whenever misconduct has resulted in a conviction, and Rule 608(b) could thus be used only for
misconduct not resulting in a conviction. Id. at 856. The first approach would work little change in
current practice and would not resolve the back-door problem. The second approach would not
resolve the inconsistency between the two rules. Broader impeachment would be allowed if a
defendant was not convicted than if the defendant was, despite the fact that the probity and
prejudice are the same.215 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
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felony. Court should apply their best judgment in close cases. Although courts
will sometimes err, the inconsistency between the rules would be reduced.
(c) Applying a Ten Year Time Limit to Rule 608(b)
The case for applying the ten year time limit of Rule 609(b) to impeachment
under Rule 608(b), and thus ending yet another of the back-door practices, is
similar to the argument for reading the limitations of Rule 609(a) (1) into Rule
608(b). It is the misconduct that is probative and prejudicial under both rules, and
the probity and prejudice are the same whether the misconduct resulted in a
conviction or not. Congress made evidence of convictions more than ten years old
inadmissible unless the proponent of impeachment can satisfy the heavy burden
of showing that "the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 256 It makes no
sense to require a party wishing to impeach a witness with an eleven year old
conviction to show that probity substantially outweighs prejudice but allow the
party to question the witness about the misconduct underlying the conviction
unless the opponent of impeachment can show that prejudice substantially
outweighs probity.
2. Allow Impeachment with the Same Criminal Misconduct Under Rules 609(a)
and 608(b)
In addition to reading several of the specific protections of Rule 609 into
Rule 608(b), courts generally should permit impeachment with the same sort of
misconduct under both rules. The reason is the one stressed above; namely, that
it is the misconduct that is probative and prejudicial, not whether the misconduct
resulted in a conviction. Complete consistency plainly is not possible. The scope
of misconduct admissible under Rule 608(b) necessarily exceeds that of Rule
609(a) because Rule 609(a) is limited to misconduct that resulted in a criminal
conviction. Rule 608(b) encompasses not only conduct resulting in a criminal
conviction but also criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction and some
noncriminal conduct that bears on credibility.257 Nonetheless, there is substantial
overlap. Prior misconduct that is criminal in nature should be equally admissible
under both rules. While judges may disagree about what kinds of criminal
2561d. 609(b).
257Rule 609 can be seen as governing a subset of misconduct; namely, that resulting in a
criminal conviction, or, as Professor Uviller puts it, "a special case of impeachment by prior
misconduct." See Uviller, supra note 234, at 795. In addition, strong policy reasons support the rule
that prior convictions may be proven with extrinsic evidence while prior bad acts may not. A
conviction is relatively easy to prove with a single piece of paper. Bad acts are not so easy to prove.
Allowing extrinsic evidence would likely lead to mini-trials about whether the bad act occurred.
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misconduct is probative of credibility, individual judges should apply their
judgment on that issue consistently between the two rules.
Arguments that one or the other of the rules should be construed more
narrowly are unpersuasive. It might be argued that Rule 609(a) should be
construed more narrowly because of the potentially explosive impact of a criminal
conviction on the jury, particularly if the witness is a criminal defendant. Under
this view, a conviction indicates the wrongdoing was particularly reprehensible
because the authorities chose to devote sufficient resources to secure a conviction.
If criminal misconduct did not result in a conviction, it probably was because the
wrongdoing did not seem bad enough to warrant full-scale prosecution. A fear
that convictions are more prejudicial than bad acts not resulting in conviction may
underlie the decisions of many courts to restrict inquiry about convictions to the
name of the crime, the date of conviction, and the sentence, while allowing
broader inquiry into the facts underlying misconduct not resulting in a
conviction.258
This argument for a more restrictive reading of Rule 609(a), however, is
based on several assumptions that are not necessarily true and that jurors may not
make. Cases involving the "worst" robberies, assaults or thefts are not always the
ones prosecuted to conclusion. Many other factors influence prosecution
decisions. Backlogs,259 proof problems, the policy choices of prosecutors, and the
financial resources of defendants26° influence whether a case is prosecuted
258See supra note 219 and accompanying text.259As early as 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice concluded: "America's system of criminal justice is ... overworked, undermanned, [and]
underfinanced .... See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 12 (1967). Criminal courts are buried in cases and have
been for decades, particularly in large urban centers. See, e.g., WILSON R. PALACIOS, ET AL., CRIME
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 29-30 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing near collapse of Philadelphia criminal
courts in 1990 when backlog jumped from 12,129 to 32,880 because defendants failed to appear).
This problem has been regularly reported in the press. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Justice System in
State Found Nearing Chaos, Study Panel Asserts It Is "Choking on Numbers, "N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1981, at BI (reporting backlog problems of New York state courts); Irving R. Kaufman, The
Judicial System, Ailing, Needs Help, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1984, at A19 (noting that "poorly
compensated judges stagger under the burden of case loads"); E.R. Shipp, City's Courts Clogged
by Increase in Cases and Lack of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1982, at Al (observing that
"criminal courts in New York City are overwhelmed"); Michael Slackman, Full Court Pressure,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 9, 1990, at 5 (discussing backlog problem in Suffolk County system in New York).
26 No one would seriously assert that rich and poor receive the same treatment in the criminal
justice system. Donald H. Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State Criminal Justice Systems: A
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 31,40
(1985); see also Carl Kenney, Tomorrow, All Eyes on the County Courthouse, HERALD SUN
(Durham, N.C.), July 23, 2000, at A17 (asserting that profit is motivation of legal system and only
people with money have fair chance in court); Paying for Justice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 16, 2000, at 18
(stating that failure to give poor adequate representation results in unfairness and higher conviction
rate for poor defendants). For discussions of the different treatment accorded rich and poor
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vigorously at least as much as the seriousness of one robbery or assault compared
to another. In addition, whether it is true or not, many people appear to believe
that criminals are let off on technicalities. This message is reinforced constantly
through the media.26' Consequently, many jurors may assume that a witness is
guilty of criminal acts asked about on cross-examination even though the acts
didn't result in a conviction. Finally, most jurors probably presume the judge
wouldn't allow a witness to be asked about bad acts that didn't occur,262 thus
further equalizing the impact of bad acts and convictions.
If it is the misconduct that impeaches rather than the conviction, courts
should allow the same amount of detail to reach the jury whether the misconduct
resulted in a conviction or not.263 The practice of some courts in restricting cross-
examination under Rule 609 to the name of crime, the date of conviction, and the
sentence, and refusing to allow questions about the underlying details,2" may
deprive jurors of crucial information about the witness's credibility and may
confuse or mislead them. The name of a crime may not indicate clearly what the
crime is, particularly if the witness violated a complex federal criminal statute. 65
Moreover, jurors may not know the elements even of common crimes.266 Thus,
defendants, see generally, LEWIS R. KATZ, ET AL., JUSTICE IS THE CRIME, PRETRIAL DELAY IN
FELONY CASES (1972) (arguing that poor defendants are more likely to be victims of pretrial delay);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 51 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (noting that poor defendants often lack
resources necessary to mount effective defense); PAUL WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE (1974) (observing
that poor defendants are less likely to receive pretrial release).261See, e.g., David R. Dow, Feeding the Public's Fear; When Newspapers Say a Conviction
Was "Reversed on a Technicality, " They Insult Our Constitution and Judicial System, TEX. LAW.,
Mar. 11, 1996, at 22 (arguing that media often cheapen law and policy by latching on word
'technicality'); Frank Main & Abdon M. Pallasch, Follow "Dirty Money, " CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Aug.
8, 2001, at 7 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft as saying, "Judicial restraint means judges
refusing to create on their own a criminal justice system that lets clearly guilty criminals off on a
technicality."); Richard J. Meislin, The Crime Without Punishment Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1981, at B1 (citing financial difficulties as one reason New York state "flushes all but the most
serious cases through the system as quick as possible").
262Unfortunately, this assumption often is untrue because courts apply an extremely lax
standard for determining whether bad acts actually occurred. This issue is addressed infra notes
301-27 and accompanying text.2638ee Uviller, supra note 240, at 803-08 (arguing for this result).264See supra note 219 and accompanying text.265For example, jurors would not really know what the witness did wrong if the court limited
the prosecutor to asking, "Isn't it true that you were convicted of violating 29 U.S.C. § 501 making
it a crime to violate your fiduciary responsibilities as an officer of a labor organization?" or to
asking, "Isn't it true that you were convicted of violating § 1962 of the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act making it a crime unlawfully to receive income from a pattern of
racketeering activity?"2661t seems unlikely, for example, that lay jurors would readily know the differences between
robbery, larceny, and burglary. Robbery is generally defined as the "[f]elonious taking of personal
property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
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jurors often will not know precisely what the witness did wrong unless they are
given some details about the underlying acts.
It might be argued credibility is impeached simply by the fact a serious crime
was committed, and the details are unimportant. But not all felonies have the same
probative value or present the same possibility of prejudice.267 In addition, even
if the court tells the jurors the elements of the impeaching crime, they still may
not have all of the information that bears on credibility. Context may be crucial.
As Charles A. Wright and Victor J. Gold point out:
Given the proper circumstances, virtually any kind of misconduct can
be probative of untruthfulness. Acts of violence can be depraved to the
point that they suggest the actor rejects all societal norms, including the
duty to testify truthfully. Acts of sexual immorality can be at the center
of a web of deceit.2 6
8
The point of allowing questioning about a conviction is to impeach a witness's
credibility. Jurors should be given the facts that specifically bear on that issue.269
United States v. Hurs'7 ° provides an example of a court allowing an
appropriate inquiry into underlying details. One of the defendants had a prior
conviction for attempting to obstruct justice, and defense counsel brought this out
on direct examination.27" ' When the government sought to ask about the details on
cross-examination, the defense objected.272 The trial court overruled the
objection.273 The attempted obstruction ofjustice was offering a bribe to a police
officer to file a false paper to create an alibi for another person in a bank robbery
accomplished by means of force or fear." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1492 (4th ed. 1951). Larceny,
by contrast, is simply the "[f]elonious stealing [of] ... another's personalty . . . with intent to
convert it or to deprive the owner thereof." Id. at 1023. Burglary is "[t]he breaking and entering the
house of another in the nighttime, with intent to commit a felony therein, whether the felony be
actually committed or not." Id. at 247.267See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6134, at 224.268Id. § 6118, at 104.269See People v. Sorge, 93 N.E. 2d 637, 639 (N.Y. 1950) ("Since a witness may be examined
properly with respect to criminal acts that have escaped prosecution, there is no reason why
indictment followed by conviction should proscribe inquiry as to what those acts were. A
knowledge of these acts casts light upon the degree of turpitude involved and assists the jury in
evaluating the witness' credibility." (internal citations omitted)).
270951 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1991).
2711d. at 1500.
2721d
"
2731d.
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case.274 The court concluded that the specific conduct was directly relevant to the
defendant's credibility.275
The Hurst court also allowed the prosecutor to ask very detailed questions
about the attempt to bribe the police officer.27 6 Such questioning should be
allowed under both Rules 609(a) and 608(b) as long as the facts are not unduly
prejudicial. Undue prejudice might occur if the questioner is allowed to ask about
inflammatory information not directly relevant to credibility. In Hurst, questions
about the name of the officer, the time and place of the attempted bribe, and the
amount of the bribe were not unduly prejudicial.277
Some commentators contend that Rule 608(b) should be construed to permit
impeachment with fewer kinds of misconduct than Rule 609(a)(1).2 78 Two main
arguments are offered in support. Neither argument is persuasive.
The first argument is that the wording of Rule 609(a)(1) is broader than the
wording of Rule 608(b). Rule 609(a)(1) allows any felony to be admitted "[f]or
2741d
2751d. The district court apparently reached this result by combining Rule 609(a) and Rule
608(b), allowing the details underlying the conviction to be admitted under 608(b). While the result
might have been reached solely under Rule 609(a), the court was correct in harmonizing the
application of the Rules.2761d. The prosecutor's questioning was as follows:
And at that time in 1982, sir, you were charged in the Western District of Tennessee,
were you not, with attempting to obstruct justice by offering Jerry Wyatt, chief of
police of Brownsville, Tennessee, a payment of up to $10,000 to Jerry Wyatt if Jerry
Wyatt would place a false document in the Brownsville Police Department records
showing that David Eugene Graham had been in the Haywood County, Tennessee area
on August the 7th of 1979 between nine o'clock and nine-twenty a.m. The purpose of
that false document was to create an alibi for David Eugene Graham who was to go on
trial two days later on September the 8th of 1982 in the United States District Court in
the Eastern District of Tennessee, that is in Chattanooga, in which David Graham had
been charged with bank robbery which had occurred on August the 7th, 1979. And that
was the basis for your obstruction of justice charge, wasn't it, sir?
Id.
2771d United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984), also is instructive in deciding which details
of prior misconduct should be revealed. Abel concerned the use of prior bad acts to show bias. See
id. at 47. Mills, a defense witness, testified that Ehle, a government witness, told Mills he planned
to implicate the defendant falsely for government favors. Id. The prosecutor wished to question
Mills about whether he, Ehle, and the defendant all belonged to a secret prison organization named
the Aryan Brotherhood "that required its members always to deny the existence of the organization
and to commit perjury, theft, and murder on each member's behalf." Id. The Court held that the
tenets of the organization were properly admissible to show bias and that the trial court correctly
forbade the prosecutor from using the name because it was unduly prejudicial. Id. at 54-55.
27
.See, e.g., WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6118, at 102-04 (arguing for narrower
interpretation of Rule 608(b); Gold, supra note 97, at 2310 n.77 (same); Okun, supra note 97, at 545
(same); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, § 608.22[2][c], at 608-56 to -57 (making
same argument implicitly).
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the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness." '279 Rule 608(b), by contrast,
says that "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness... may ... if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness... ."28 Because credibility is a broader concept than character for
truthfulness, Rule 608(b) should be construed to limit questions to conduct
directly involving lying or deception, while Rule 609(a) may be construed to
allow questions about more kinds of felonious misconduct.281
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, as explained in Part
II, there is no evidence in the legislative history of Rule 608(b) that Congress
intended to choose the narrow view over the broad view as to what kinds of
misconduct bears on one's character for truthfulness.282 Second, credibility and
character for truthfulness overlap in meaning. Credibility is "that quality in a
witness which renders his evidence worthy of belief." '283 "Character" is "[t]he
aggregate of the moral qualities which belong to and distinguish an individual
person., 284 "Truthfulness" is the moral quality of "telling the truth, esp.
habitually. '285 Not surprisingly, commentators generally use credibility and
character for truthfulness interchangably. 286 Third, Rule 608(b) as originally
enacted appears to equate credibility and character for truthfulness. It reads:
"Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
They may, however,... be inquired into on cross examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ... 287
Although the words "credibility" and "character for truthfulness" are in different
sentences, they appear to be used to mean the same thing.
279FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
28
°Id. 608(b).
281See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6118, at 102-03 (criticizing courts that interpret
"probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness" to "mean[] merely that the evidence is probative on
the question of credibility," and contending that "truthfulness or untruthfulness" "refers to the
general character of the witness for veracity, not whether specific testimony of the witness is
correct"); Okun, supra note 97, at 545 ("Rule 608(b) limits impeachment by specific instances of
misconduct to instances that are directly relevant to the witness' character for truthfulness .... Rule
609(a) allows impeachment with conviction for crimes that bear only a marginal relationship to the
witness' veracity.").28 See supra notes 136-54 and accompanying text.
283BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 440 (4th ed. 1951).
284Id. at 294.
285RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2031 (2d ed. 1987).
2 86See, e.g., WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 136, § 608.22[2][b], at 608-53 ("[M]isconduct
need not be punishable as a crime to be relevant to a witness's credibility, so long as it is probative
of truthfulness.").
287FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (emphasis added).
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One might argue that credibility is broader than character for truthfulness
because credibility can be impeached in many different ways, such as by
contradicting a witness, showing the witness made a prior statement inconsistent
with trial testimony, or showing a witness is biased. Arguably, these ways of
impeaching credibility may not directly implicate a witness's character for lying
or telling the truth. For example, a prosecutor might ask, "Isn't it true you are the
defendant's mother?" The question doesn't necessarily suggest that the mother is
not a truthful person. Rather, she may so fear for her son that she will shade her
testimony, perhaps without intending to, in order to protect him. This argument
gains some support from the recent proposal to replace the word "credibility" with
the phrase "character for truthfulness" in the first sentence of Rule 608(b). The
sentence as amended would read: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. 288 According to the Advisory Committee's Note, some courts
interpreted the original rule to bar the use of extrinsic evidence to show
contradiction, a prior inconsistent statement, or bias, which was not the intent of
the drafters.289 The Advisory Committee called use of the word credibility
"overbroad," suggesting, at least implicitly, that the phrase "character for
truthfulness" has a somewhat narrower scope.2 9°
It is true that traditionally each method of impeachment has had its own rules
on the use of extrinsic evidence. 29' These rules are based not on the nature of the
impeachment per se, but rather on practical concerns such as keeping the trial
from veering off into collateral matters. 92 The extrinsic evidence issue aside, it
is difficult to see why "specific instances of conduct" under 608(b)-that is, bad
acts, often criminal in nature-go to a witness's character for truthfulness, while
evidence of contradiction, a prior inconsistent statement, or bias do not, and
instead go only to some broader issue of credibility. If evidence is presented
contradicting a witness's testimony, surely that evidence suggests the witness has
a bad character for truthfulness. Evidence that a witness made a prior inconsistent
statement suggests the same thing.
288Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, Civil and
Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence, 201 F.R.D. 560, 735-36 (2001). [ed. note: This
amendment took effect on December 1, 2003.]2891d. at 736-37.
290See id. at 737.
29Convictions and bias, for example, traditionally have been provable using extrinsic
evidence. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984).292For example, extrinsic evidence may only be used to prove a prior inconsistent statement
if the questioner could have introduced the prior statement as a part his or her direct case. See
Denver City Tramway Co. v. Lomovt, 126 P. 276 (Colo. 1912).
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Even evidence of bias may suggest a bad character for truthfulness in some
instances. Character for truthfulness does not include only a willingness to
fabricate consciously. People may misstate without meaning to or because they
cannot help themselves. Everyone has at least one friend for whom "I wish I had"
becomes "I did." Moreover, bias is defined as "a particular tendency or inclination
... that prevents unprejudiced consideration of a question. 293 This sounds much
like a character trait that interferes with one's ability to tell the truth. Bias may be
more limited in scope than character for truthfulness-the mother might lie for her
son but not lie generally. On the other hand, some bias, like racial or ethnic bias,
can affect one's willingness or ability to be objective in many different
contexts.294
Finally, even if credibility is broader than character for truthfulness,
credibility should not be read more broadly in the context of impeachment by
convictions and bad acts. A conviction does not impeach credibility by showing
contradiction (unless the witness denies it), a prior inconsistent statement, or bias.
Instead, a conviction impeaches credibility in exactly the same way as a criminal
bad act. Both suggest the witness is not a law-abiding, moral person, and therefore
is not worthy of belief. In sum, although "credibility" and "character for
truthfulness" may not mean exactly the same thing, the overlap is substantial in
the context of bad act and conviction impeachment. Consequently, use of the
word credibility in Rule 609 should not be interpreted as a signal to allow
impeachment with more kinds of misconduct than are admissible under Rule
608(b) as bearing on character for truthfulness.
Wright and Gold offer the second argument for a narrower reading of Rule
608(b). They contend that courts should construe Rule 608(b) to allow
impeachment with fewer kinds of misconduct than Rule 609(a)(1) because it is
less certain that misconduct not resulting in conviction occurred:
Evidence admitted under Rule 609 relates to witness misconduct that is
almost certain to have occurred since it was the subject of a criminal
conviction. Evidence of misconduct offered under Rule 608 need not
pass the "beyond the reasonable doubt" standard. It can be offered so
long as one witness is willing to allege that the misconduct occurred. In
this respect, evidence offered under Rule 608 has less probative value
than Rule 609 evidence. In order to balance this factor, it may make
293RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 202 (2d ed. 1987).
2
"One other method of impeachment seems directly aimed at revealing a witness's character
for truthfulness. Reputation and opinion evidence offered to impeach under Rule 608(a) is
specifically limited to testimony about a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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sense to demand a closer connection to truthfulness or untruthfulness
from evidence offered under Rule 608.295
There are two flaws in this argument. First, it wrongly assumes we actually know
the misconduct resulting in a criminal conviction occurred beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is true only for the very small percentage of criminal convictions
obtained after a trial. In some jurisdictions 95 percent or more of all convictions
are obtained by guilty plea.2 96 Defendants plead guilty for many reasons not
related to guilt,297 and the charge pled to may not be the crime actually
committed.298 Consequently, a conviction for a particular crime rarely tells us
what misconduct occurred beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed, it may
affirmatively misrepresent the witness's prior misconduct.
Second, Wright and Gold's argument improperly mixes together the nature
of the misconduct with how certain it is that the misconduct occurred. These are
295WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 104, § 6118, at 103-04 n.50; see also Richard Friedman,
Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38
UCLA L. REv. 637,644 (1991) (asserting that "a criminal conviction represents a determination by
thejudicial system, after its most painstaking type of proceeding, that a given fact-the defendant's
guilt of a crime-is true"). Wright and Gold subsequently qualified this argument somewhat by
recognizing that some convictions produce unreliable decisions. See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note
104, § 6140, at 284-90 (discussing inadmissability of "tainted" convictions); Gold, supra note 97,
at 2310 n.77 (stating that "serious barriers to admissibility may exist where a conviction was
obtained without providing defendant with assistance of counsel or in a jurisdiction that does not
adhere to other conventional notions of due process").
296See Bill Johnson, Do Forfeiture Cases Place Justice on Sale?, DETROIT NEWS, June 28,
2002, at 2 (stating that 97% of all criminal cases are plea-bargained); AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 14.4 (1986) (noting that in some localities,
90% or more of convictions are obtained by guilty plea); Greg Stohr, Top US. Court to Weigh
Prosecution Duty to Disclose Evidence, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 4,2002 (noting that federal courts
convict 95% of defendants by plea bargain).
297See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 205,
207, 216-19 (noting that defendants often plead guilty to obtain specific sentence rather than
gambling on longer sentence if convicted at trial). Guilty pleas may be coerced by threatening
lengthy incarceration or high bail if a defendant asserts her innocence, while offering a short
sentence or even probation if the defendant pleads guilty. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 260,
at 30; see also N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON ATTICA, ATTICA, THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 30-31 (1972) (noting that plea bargaining system is
characterized by deception and hypocrisy).298See United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1501 (6th Cir. 1991) ("In this day in which most
pleas are products of plea bargaining, and usually charge bargaining, the statutory name of the
offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is rarely informative, and often misinformative, about
the nature of the offense to which guilt is acknowledged as the plea allocation."); Daniel Givelber,
Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49
RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1342-43 (1997) (noting that defendants sometimes plead guilty to lesser
charges not because they are guilty of those charges but to avoid danger of being tried on more
serious charges).
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independent variables that should be assessed separately. The first inquiry under
both rules is whether the alleged prior misconduct is probative of credibility. That
depends on the nature of the act. The second inquiry is whether the prior
misconduct occurred. If it did, then it tells us whatever it tells us about the
witness's credibility. If it did not occur, it tells us nothing, and it should be
excluded. It makes no sense to allow impeachment when there is little evidence
the prior misconduct occurred and then try to regulate or monitor the unfair
prejudice by restricting the kind of misconduct asked about. Conversely, it makes
no sense to allow impeachment with misconduct having little or no bearing on
credibility merely because we are very sure it occurred. Thus, under both rules,
a court should allow the same kind of misconduct to be used to impeach whether
it resulted in a conviction or not. A court should not be more restrictive under
Rule 608(b). Also under both rules, court should require an appropriate level of
assurance that the misconduct occurred. What that level of assurance should be
is discussed in the next subsection.
3. Apply the Huddleston Prima Facie Case Standard for Determining Whether
the Prior Misconduct Occurred
Huddleston v. United States2 99 addressed the question of how much evidence
should be required to admit crimes, wrongs, or acts for substantive purposes under
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 30 0 The Court required a prima facie case; that is, enough
evidence from which ajury might reasonably conclude by a preponderance of the
evidence that the prior misconduct occurred.3 °1 The Court's reasoning in
Huddleston is directly applicable to the use of misconduct for impeachment.3"2
Consequently, courts should apply the Huddleston standard in determining the
admissibility of misconduct under Rules 609 and 608(b) to ensure that witnesses
are not unjustly impeached with convictions or bad acts they did not commit.
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of crimes or other misconduct is not admissible
"to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.""3 3 Such evidence may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
"such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... 304 In Huddleston, the defendant
was charged with selling stolen blank videocassette tapes in interstate
299485 U.S. 681 (1988).
3
°°1d. at 685.
3 Id. at 689-90.
302Surprisingly, research has disclosed no cases applying the Huddleston rule in the
impeachment context.303FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
304Id
"
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commerce. °5 Defendant claimed he did not know the tapes were stolen, thus
putting knowledge in issue.3" 6 The prosecutor sought to introduce evidence the
defendant sold stolen merchandise on two other occasions as tending to show that
defendant knew the tapes were stolen.3"7
The defendant argued the government should be required to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the merchandise from the other sales was
stolen before evidence of those sales could be admitted.30 8 The Court rejected this
argument, finding "it is inconsistent with the structure of the Rules of Evidence
and with the plain language of Rule 404(b)."30 9 The Court noted Rule 404(b)
contains no intimation that any preliminary showing must be made before bad acts
can be introduced for a permissible purpose.3 10 In addition, the legislative history
did not show Congress intended to impose any particular standard of proof.3 '
Thus, other crimes, wrongs, or acts are admissible under Rule 404(b) as long as
they are relevant under Rule 402 and not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.3l2
The Court stressed, however, that it was not authorizing the government to
"parade past the jury a litany of potentially prejudicial similar acts that have been
established or connected to the defendant only by unsubstantiated innuendo. 3t 3
The Court based this limitation on Rule 402's relevance requirement.3 4 Evidence
is admissible only if it is relevant, and in the Rule 404(b) context, "evidence is
relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor. ' '315 Thus, evidence of misconduct is admissible only if
the proponent offers enough proof for a jury reasonably to conclude by a
preponderance that the defendant committed the misconduct.316 In Huddleston
itself the Court concluded the government submitted sufficient evidence the
defendant sold stolen merchandise on the other occasions to satisfy this burden.31 7
The Court's analysis in Huddleston is directly applicable to the admissibility
of convictions and bad acts under Rules 609(a) and 608(b). The same standard of
proof should be required for exactly the same reasons. As with Rule 404(b), Rules
305485 U.S. at 682.
3061d. at 684.
3'71d. at 683.3081d. at 687 n.5.
'91d. at 687.
31 Id at 687-88. Rule 404(b) says simply that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" is
not admissible to prove character but may be admissible for other purposes without specifying any
specific amount of evidence that must be submitted. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
31 1Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688-89.
3 21d
"3 131d. at 689.
3
'
41d. at 688-89.
3 15 d. at 689.
3 'Id. at 689-90.
3 171d. at 690-91.
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609(a) and 608(b) do not require any particular quantum of proof the prior
misconduct occurred. Rule 609(a) says "evidence" that a witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted to impeach credibility if the various
burdens and other requirements of the rule are satisfied." 8 Rule 608(b) likewise
says that "[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness ... may... be inquired
into on cross-examination" if the court believes they are probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness.3 9 In addition, as with Rule 404(b), there is no indication in the
legislative history that the Advisory Committee or Congress meant to require any
particular amount of proof that misconduct occurred to use it for impeachment
under Rules 609 or 608(b).32° Rules 609(a) and 608(b) also are subject to the
general relevance requirements of Rule 402. Under Rule 402, "[e]vidence which
is not relevant is not admissible., 32 Evidence of prior misconduct is relevant for
impeachment purposes "only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act
occurred and that the [witness] was the actor. "322 If no juror could reasonably
conclude the witness committed the misconduct, then the evidence is irrelevant
and inadmissible. Consequently, courts should not admit evidence of misconduct
for impeachment purposes under either Rule 609(a) or Rule 608(b) unless the
Huddleston standard is satisfied; that is, unless there is enough evidence for ajury
reasonably to conclude by a preponderance the prior misconduct occurred.
The Huddleston standard would require courts to evaluate evidence of
wrongdoing more carefully before admitting it under Rules 609(a) or 608(b). As
noted above, some commentators naively assert that a conviction gives sufficient
assurance some particular misconduct occurred.3 23 This is only true of convictions
after a trial. Because a guilty plea may affirmatively misrepresent a defendant's
wrongdoing,12 courts should require additional proof of what a witness actually
did wrong beyond a court record or rap sheet that merely lists the charge pled to.
Unless a witness admits the facts underlying a conviction obtained by guilty plea,
a court should require additional information from court or prosecution files, such
as a sworn complaint by the victim of the crime or statements by witnesses
confirming the specific misconduct the witness engaged in.325
"'FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
3 91d. 608(b).
32
.See supra notes 93-160 and accompanying text.321FED. R. EVID. 402.322Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.
323See supra note 287 and accompanying text.324See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.325Requiring more than a simple court record of a conviction might run afoul of FED. R. EVID.
803(22). With certain limitations, Rule 803(22) makes an exception to the rule excluding hearsay
for evidence of a felony conviction, whether after a trial or upon a guilty plea. See id. The rules
exclude hearsay because it is unreliable. Exceptions are made for more reliable kinds of hearsay.
See id. 803. By making an exception for a record of conviction, id 803(22), the rulemakers plainly
indicated they thought such records to be reliable. Perhaps Rule 803(22) should be amended
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Moreover, courts should not rely on rap sheets for impeachment information.
Rap sheets are notoriously unreliable. They typically contain incomplete,
inaccurate, and ambiguous information. For example, an audit of New York
State's computerized criminal history information system revealed that disposition
information was simply missing in 45 percent of the cases sampled and was
inaccurate or ambiguous in another 19 percent of the cases.326 A national survey
of district attorneys, defense agencies, and state planning agencies showed similar
problems of incompleteness and ambiguity.327 As the court correctly concluded
in United States v. Constant,"' "to ask a defendant whether he has had criminal
convictions, without possessing a certified copy of the record, is fraught with
possibilities of error." '329 Courts should allow questioning about prior convictions
only when reliable information is used to establish the prima facie case.
The prima facie case standard also should be applied in place of the good
faith basis test currently used under Rule 608(b) for assessing the admissibility of
criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction or misconduct not criminal in
nature.33° No one knows what constitutes a good faith basis. It might be anything
because, as argued above, a record of a guilty plea often does not reliably indicate what the
defendant did wrong. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. Alternatively, courts might
exclude court records under Rules 403 and 611 unless additional details are provided for convictions
upon guilty pleas.326See Donald L. Doernberg & Donald H. Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An
Analysis of Computerized Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1159
tbl. I (1980). The study included four types of inaccurate entries: (1) the basic disposition was
incorrect (conviction listed for dismissal or vice versa), (2) multiple listings indicated a plea to more
than one count when there was a plea only to a single count, (3) sentences were recorded
incorrectly, and (4) the original conviction was listed but a reversal on appeal was not shown. Id.
at 1159 n.264.3271d. at 1164-73.
328501 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1974).
3291d. at 1288 (quoting Ciravolo v. United States, 384 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 1967)). But see
United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Although the 'rap sheet' is not
admissible as public record of the conviction, we have long held use of that record to cross-examine
upon prior convictions is proper conduct.").
33Courts have continued to apply the good faith basis test in Rule 608(b) cases post-
Huddleston. See, e.g., United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 22-23 (1 st Cir. 200 1) (applying good
faith basis test); Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 294 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); United States v.
Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 946 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Williams, 986 F.2d 86, 89
(4th Cir. 1993) (same).
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from proof by a preponderance to third-hand hearsay and innuendo.3
Commentators rightly criticize this standard as so vague it invites abuse.332
Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick suggest "[p]robably the mere fact of
arrest provides a reasonable basis to ask whether the witness did the deed, at least
in the absence of some further indication that the arrest was a mistake or abuse of
some kind. '333 Courts, however, should be particularly cautious in relying upon
rap sheet arrest information unaccompanied by a disposition to establish a prima
facie case because the information often substantially overstates the actual
wrongdoing. Police officers routinely overcharge, assuming that the charges will
be reduced in the plea bargaining process. The audit of the New York State rap
sheet system revealed that arrest charges are often superceded by the District
Attorney.334 When there is a change, the charge is almost always reduced.335 In the
cases sampled, between 17 and 25 percent of felony arrest charges were reduced
by the time formal charges were filed.33 6 Moreover, the reduction in the level of
charges from arrest to disposition is even more dramatic. The data showed that
nearly all felony arrests resulted either in a favorable disposition or in the
conviction of a lower charge, frequently a misdemeanor.3 37 The frequent failure
of rap sheets to show dispositions results in a substantial exaggeration of
'Professor John R. Schmertz suggests three possible standards, any of which might rationally
be used:
(1) that counsel must have credible and admissible evidence at hand to prove the
occurrence of misconduct; (2) that counsel must be aware of the existence of admissible
evidence but need not have such ready to introduce into evidence; or (3) that counsel
must be able to show the court that he or she learned of the misconduct from reasonably
reliable sources whether or not they qualify for admission under the Federal Rules.
Schmertz, supra note 84, at 1437. Professor Schmertz further states that the reported decisions "are
few and inconsistent as to what constitutes a 'good faith basis."' Id.332See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 247, at 145 ("This standard lacks uniform application and
can have a threshold so low as to be nonexistent."); Schmertz, supra note 84, at 1436 (noting
problem of "the impeaching question that rests on a flimsy or speculative basis, such as multiple
hearsay or unconfirmed rumor"). Abuse is reported in some cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Crutchfield, 26 F.3d 1098, 1102 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that government questions attempting
to implicate witness as large scale buyer or distributor of marijuana lacked even good faith basis);
United States v. DeGeratto, 876 F.2d 576, 584 (7th Cir. 1989) (calling questions suggesting
defendant knowingly helped prostitution operation "an unworthy attempt by the government").
333MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 6.40, at 824.334Doernberg & Zeigler, supra note 326, at 1162. Prosecutors also have an incentive to
overcharge so they have room to plea bargain.
3 3 5
1d
3 36
1d
3371d. at 1163-64.
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defendants' criminal records.338 Thus, courts should not allow questioning about
a bad act based solely on an arrest charge.
Although the Huddleston prima facie case standard should govern the
admissibility of convictions and bad acts for impeachment as well as for
substantive Rule 404(b) purposes, slightly different procedures would be required
with bad acts because of the rule banning extrinsic evidence to prove them.
Huddleston treated the admissibility of crimes or acts under Rule 404(b) as an
issue of conditional relevance governed by Rule 104(b); that is, evidence of
misconduct is admissible "upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding" that the misconduct occurred.3 39 Once the
threshold determination is made by the court, the jury ultimately decides whether
the misconduct occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. With bad act
impeachment, however, a cross-examiner is not allowed to introduce extrinsic
evidence that the misconduct occurred. Consequently, the jury is not able to make
the ultimate factual determination.
This problem could be solved by requiring the cross-examiner in a sidebar
to convince the trial judge that the misconduct occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence before the cross-examiner may ask about it. This solution, however,
would establish a different standard of proof for convictions and bad acts. The
problem could be at least partly solved by requiring the cross-examiner to make
a prima facie case to the judge. While not entirely satisfactory, this requirement
would eliminate the worst abuses under the "good faith basis" standard.
4. Harmonize Rules 609(a)(2) and 608(b) in Practice.
My final suggestion for achieving greater consistency of application between
the rules is to harmonize Rules 609(a)(2) and 608(b) in practice. Under Rule
609(a)(2), evidence that any witness has been convicted is automatically
admissible if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. 340 Rule 608(b), by
contrast, makes all bad act impeachment discretionary. 34' Therefore, a court can
exclude exactly the same misconduct under Rule 608(b) that it must admit under
Rule 609(a)(2) if the conduct resulted in a conviction. Harmonizing the
application of these two rules in practice would largely eliminate this final back-
door problem.
33 81n the New York audit, in 45 percent of the cases for which dispositions could be found in
court records, the rap sheets did not report disposition charges at all-they were blank! Id. at
1158-59 tbll. The national survey showed that a problem of missing dispositions of similar
magnitude exists nationwide. Id. at 1167-68.
339Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689-90 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(b)).34 0FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
'4'ld. 608(b).
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There are several possible ways to resolve the inconsistency between the
rules. Rule 608(b) could be amended to make bad acts that involve dishonesty or
false statement automatically admissible. Alternatively, Rule 609(a)(2) could be
amended to replace automatic admission with Rule 403 balancing. The problem
with the first suggestion is that it conflicts with Congress's clear intent in enacting
Rule 608(b) to make all prior bad act impeachment discretionary.342 The problem
with the second suggestion is that it conflicts with the near-universal holding that
Congress rejected Rule 403 balancing for Rule 609(a)(2) convictions.343
A third possibility is to harmonize the rules in practice without amending
them. To accomplish this, courts should construe Rule 609(a)(2) narrowly so that
only convictions directly involving lying or deception are admitted automatically.
Courts should no longer admit convictions that fall in the middle of the credibility
spectrum, such as robbery, drug offenses, larceny, and burglary, as some courts
do at present.344 This is a good idea in any event because the Conference
Committee probably intended that Rule 609(a)(2) be narrowly construed. 345 If
Rule 609(a)(2) is so construed, it is unlikely that the same underlying act not
resulting in conviction would be excluded under Rule 608(b). If the misconduct
directly involved lying or deceit, the party opposing impeachment would rarely
be able to satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating that the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs probative value because the probative value of
such misconduct on the issue of credibility is extremely high. Thus, even though
admission is automatic under one rule and discretionary under the other, as a
practical matter the same misconduct would be admitted and excluded under both
Rules 609(a)(2) and 608(b).
B. Toward Harmony Within Each Rule
Achieving harmony in the application of each rule is a formidable task. As
Part II clearly demonstrates, courts and legislators disagree about the kinds of
convictions and bad acts that are relevant to credibility and about the proper
weighing of probity and prejudice. The disagreements are deep-seated and long-
standing. People cling tenaciously to their own point of view. If Congress was
342See supra notes 135-63 and accompanying text.
343See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
3
"See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
34
"
5Although the Conference Report did not specify exactly which crimes would be admissible
under Rule 609(a)(2), the examples given mostly involved deceit or falsification. See supra notes
129-33 and accompanying text.
In addition, excluding a conviction under (a)(2) does not necessarily mean it cannot be used
to impeach. The conviction may still be admissible under (a)(l) if the standards of that subsection
are satisfied. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). Because those standards are so vague, federal judges
favoring broad impeachment could continue to allow the conviction into evidence in almost all
cases. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
696 [2003:635
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
unable to reach any meaningful compromise in enacting Rules 609 and 608, how
might a compromise be reached for the twenty-first century?
There is little point in advocating that courts take a broad view or a narrow
view or in suggesting a specific list of crimes and misconduct that should be
admissible or inadmissible. Commentators have made such suggestions in the past
only to be ignored by any judge that does not already agree with their
proposals.346 Judges are fully familiar with the arguments for and against the
broad and narrow views. They have made up their minds, and no amount of
exhortation is likely to change their views.
Instead of proposing the specific elements of a compromise, I propose a
process for working toward a compromise. The first step in the process is to
convince people holding different views that a compromise is a good idea.
Hopefully, Parts II and III of this Article will convince readers that the present
state of affairs is untenable. But why should individual members of the Advisory
Committee, Congress, or the Judiciary be willing to accept rules with which they
in part disagree? One reason is compromise would curb what each side sees as the
worst abuses. People favoring restrictive rules presumably are horrified when a
judge allows a criminal defendant charged with a serious crime to be impeached
with a conviction for the same crime or similar bad acts despite the enormously
unfair prejudice that inevitably occurs. Conversely, people favoring wide-open
impeachment presumably are just as horrified when a judge refuses to allow
impeachment with convictions for serious crimes or criminal acts that show a total
disregard for the rule of law on the ground the misconduct does not bear directly
on credibility. While one judge may feel that appropriate impeachment is taking
place in his or her own courtroom, the judge in the next courtroom may be
applying standards that first judge thinks are anathema (and vice versa!). Once
rule-makers, legislators, and judges have accepted the idea that a genuine
compromise might help curb "terrible" abuses, they must recognize that in order
to get something, each side must give something up. That is what compromise
3
"See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 295, at 638 (suggesting that "character impeachment of a
criminal defendant who takes the witness stand ought to be abolished in all of its forms-opinion
and reputation, specific bad acts, and prior convictions"); Gainor, supra note 97, at 769-70
(proposing that Rule 609(a) "be revised to strictly limit the use of evidence of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes to those crimes that bear directly on the criminal defendant's credibility, and
to establish a clear, uniformly applicable test of probative value versus prejudicial effect"); Okun,
supra note 97, at 537 (urging that impeachment under Rules 608 and 609 "be limited to those
situations where a defendant affirmatively places his or her character for truthful or law-abiding
behavior in issue"); Ordover, supra note 247, at 137 (arguing that "extrinsic crime evidence has
become so overused that cases in which it is introduced have the ethos of a presumption of guilt
rather than innocence" and proposing means of reducing use of such evidence); Robert G. Spector,
Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 334, 343 (1979) (contending that no
prior convictions should be admitted).
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means: it is an agreement upon an intermediate position between conflicting
positions.347
The next step is to identify common ground and thus narrow the areas of
disagreement. Convictions and bad acts fall on a credibility spectrum. At one end
is conduct that is particularly probative of credibility. At the other end is conduct
that seems largely unrelated to credibility. It should be possible to reach a
tentative agreement on the kinds of misconduct at each end of the spectrum. For
example, while agreement is not universal, most people agree that misconduct
directly involving lying or deceit, such as perjury, forgery, and various kinds of
fraud, is particularly probative of credibility and thus should be admissible to
impeach. Conversely, most people also agree that spontaneous violent conduct,
such as assault,148 has little bearing on credibility. Perhaps it could be agreed that
a short list of misconduct directly involving lying or deceit would be
automatically admissible, as is currently the case for convictions involving
dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2),3 49 and that another short list
of criminal conduct either wholly or only marginally related to credibility would
be inadmissible.
The list of automatically admissible conduct probably would be shorter than
the list of crimes currently admitted under Rule 609(a)(2) because some judges
define crimes involving "dishonesty" very broadly.350 If proponents of broad
impeachment balk at making any crimes automatically inadmissible, perhaps
opponents of broad impeachment would accept a standard similar to that of Rule
609(b), which bars convictions more than ten years old unless "the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction
supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. 351 In any event, the conflicting sides ought to be able to agree
upon short lists of conduct at either end of the spectrum that would always, or
almost always, be admissible or inadmissible.
Now the hard work begins. The heart of the disagreement concerns the kinds
of misconduct in the middle range of the spectrum, such as theft offenses,
robbery, premeditated violent crimes, and drug dealing. The next step in the
compromise process is to consider possible options. One option is to draw up lists
of misconduct and then make each kind either admissible or inadmissible.
Negotiators would trade back and forth and try to make the two lists even. While
347See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
34.See the cases cited supra notes 169-74, 180; see also United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322,
327 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that violent crimes are irrelevant to witness's character for truthfulness);
United States v. Schatzle, 901 F.2d 252, 253-54, 256 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding prior altercation of
witness inadmissible to attack his credibility).349FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
35
°See supra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
351FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
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this approach has the benefit of limiting judicial discretion, it probably is too
crude and arbitrary. A second option is to begin with an open mind and then look
to see whether the facts and circumstances of the misconduct involve deception,
conscious dishonesty, cheating, or lying. If they do, impeachment would be
allowed; if they do not, impeachment would not be allowed. While this approach
has the advantage of avoiding some of the arbitrariness of the first option, it is
very open-ended and subjective and thus does little to limit judicial discretion.
This option probably would replicate present practice because judges disagree
about what conduct is probative of credibility.
In between the approaches of no discretion or maximum discretion are
approaches that grant some discretion but seek to limit and guide it. The main
tools for cabining discretion are burdens, presumptions, and criteria. Burdens can
be light or heavy. Presumptions can be simple or strong and rebuttable or
irrebuttable. Criteria can be general or specific. Middle approaches to
impeachment would involve the use of some or all of these tools.
Rules 608(b) and 609 already make some use of burdens, presumptions, and
criteria. For example, Rule 609(a)(1) imposes a relatively light burden on the
prosecutor to demonstrate that the probative value of a felony conviction on an
accused's credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule 609(b) imposes a
heavier burden on a party proposing impeachment with a conviction more than
ten years old to show that probative value substantially outweighs prejudicial
effect. In addition, under Rule 608(b), a party opposing impeachment has the
heavy Rule 403 burden of showing that the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs probative value. As to presumptions, Rule 609(a)(2)
creates an irrebuttable presumption of admissibility of convictions involving
dishonesty or false statement. As to criteria, a conviction must be felony grade to
be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1), and a bad act must be probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness to be admitted under Rule 608(b).
Although the rules currently make some use of all three tools for limiting and
guiding discretion, they plainly do not make sufficient use of them. There are few
presumptions, and the criteria are general and vague. Moreover, courts often
ignore the burdens or get them wrong.352 Professor Uviller has expressed doubt
312See, e.g., United States v. Stoecker, 215 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating incorrectly
that bad act impeachment under Rule 608(b) is permissible only if probative value outweighs
prejudicial effect); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating incorrectly
that bad act impeachment under Rule 608(b) is permissible only if probative value outweighs
prejudicial effect); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 512, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that
prior misconduct can be excluded under Rule 403 if its prejudicial effect outweighs probative
value). But see King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 269-70 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying correct Rule 403
burden on party opposing Rule 608(b) impeachment); Bennett v. Longacre, 774 F.2d 1024, 1027
(10th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 947-49 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that
trial court erroneously concluded there was presumption of admissibility of prior convictions under
Rule 609(a)); United States v. Vanderbosch, 610 F.2d 95, 98 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating incorrectly that
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as to whether judges meaningfully can apply the different standards for
impeachment of criminal defendants and all other witnesses under Rule 609(a)(1).
He states: "[T]he perceived distinction may be consistent with our general policy
of special sensitivity to the hazards of defense, but the practical possibility of such
fine calibration of the danger of prejudice is dubious. 353
A better approach might be to impose a general presumption of admissibility
or inadmissibility of misconduct that is rebuttable if the underlying facts either do
or do not involve deception or lying. It would be very difficult, of course, to reach
agreement on which way the presumption should run. It might be possible to have
the presumption run one way for some kinds of misconduct and the opposite way
for other kinds of misconduct. Such an approach, however, runs the risk of
making the rules too complex and, again, it would be difficult to achieve
agreement on what kinds of misconduct belonged in each category.
It might be easier to insert more meaningful criteria into the rules. One
obvious source of possible criteria is Gordon v. United States,"' which sets forth
factors to consider in deciding whether to admit convictions to impeach an
accused.355 Modified to include impeachment by bad acts and of any witness, the
criteria are as follows: (1) whether the misconduct directly involved dishonesty;
(2) whether the misconduct was remote or recent; (3) if the witness is a party,
whether the misconduct is similar to the misconduct the party is currently charged
with committing; (4) the need for the party's or witness's testimony; and (5) the
importance of the issue of credibility.356
Congress did legislatively overrule Gordon and its criteria were not written
into Rule 609(a).357 Perhaps the Advisory Committee and Congress would be
willing to reconsider adopting these criteria for Rules 608(b) and 609 given the
disastrous experience with the rules since their adoption.
As noted at the outset of this Section, it is not an easy task to achieve
harmony in the application of each rule. I hope that my suggestions about the
process for seeking a compromise might prompt some reexamination of the
problem and provide a framework for discussion.
"defendant is required to show that the prejudicial effect outweighs probative value at the time the
motion is made to suppress the prior conviction"); United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38, 41 (8th
Cir. 1978) (holding that district court did not abuse discretion in excluding evidence that
prosecution witness had committed robberies because probative value did not outweigh prejudice).
353Uviller, supra note 240, at 800; see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 609.2, at 479 (3d ed. 199 1) (stating that it is "extremely doubtful" that shifting burden
to prosecutor will result in fewer convictions being admitted when witness to be impeached with
conviction is accused).
114383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
3551d. at 940-41.
3561d
"317See supra notes 99-133 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The law governing impeachment by convictions and bad acts is in disarray
and has been for a very long time. The inconsistencies between rules 609 and
608(b) and within each rule cause substantial problems in the administration of
justice. This Article makes several specific proposals to lessen inconsistency
between the rules and suggests a process for addressing the inconsistencies within
each rule. In law, as in music, harmony is greatly preferable to cacophony.

